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Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID e262426b02cfbecf0124eb7a5c5aa81b; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 01:05:36 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v37 13/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:51 -0700 Message-Id: <20220628005611.13106-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Change the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com --- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +---------- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++---------------- kernel/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++--- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++--- 7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index f25a867063e5..c2f71c22a90e 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -3056,18 +3056,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { struct lsmblob blob; size_t added_size; - u32 secid; - security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid); - /* - * Later in this patch set security_cred_getsecid() will - * provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init - * is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob - * get the value returned from security_cred_getsecid(), - * which means that the one expected by - * security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid); + security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &blob); ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); if (ret) { binder_txn_error("%d:%d failed to get security context\n", diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index a478faa6124e..61d5f23103b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred); int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp); void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); @@ -1143,9 +1143,10 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, { } -static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2834e55844db..f67f1eb7f4fa 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME; /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ static kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; static pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; -static u32 audit_sig_sid; +static struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm; /* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] @@ -1463,29 +1463,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) } case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: len = 0; - if (audit_sig_sid) { - struct lsmblob blob; - - /* - * lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob - * to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until - * audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which - * happens later in this patch set. - */ - lsmblob_init(&blob, audit_sig_sid); - err = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len); + if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err = security_secid_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len); if (err) return err; } sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sig_data) { - if (audit_sig_sid) + if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) security_release_secctx(ctx, len); return -ENOMEM; } sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; - if (audit_sig_sid) { + if (lsmblob_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) { memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } @@ -2392,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid; - struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || @@ -2403,9 +2394,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); - /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ - audit_sig_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); + security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm); } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 58b66543b4d5..316fac62d5f7 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include // struct open_how @@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context { kuid_t target_auid; kuid_t target_uid; unsigned int target_sessionid; - u32 target_sid; + struct lsmblob target_lsm; char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 1d223176285b..fa3cfe569ce2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; - u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; + struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; int pid_count; }; @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx) ctx->target_pid = 0; ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0); ctx->target_sessionid = 0; - ctx->target_sid = 0; + lsmblob_init(&ctx->target_lsm, 0); ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0'; unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees)); @@ -1116,14 +1116,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) } static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, - kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, - u32 sid, char *comm) + kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, + unsigned int sessionid, + struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; int rc = 0; - struct lsmblob blob; ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); if (!ab) @@ -1132,9 +1132,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); - if (sid) { - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); - if (security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len)) { + if (lsmblob_is_set(blob)) { + if (security_secid_to_secctx(blob, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); rc = 1; } else { @@ -1814,7 +1813,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; } @@ -1823,7 +1822,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1; if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { @@ -2765,15 +2764,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); - struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); - /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ - context->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_lsm); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2789,7 +2785,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); - struct lsmblob blob; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2801,9 +2796,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); - /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - ctx->target_sid = lsmblob_first(&blob); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_lsm); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2824,9 +2817,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &blob); - /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = lsmblob_first(&blob); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5d6029ac52f0..ecaa0b96bb26 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -488,7 +488,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; - u32 secid; struct lsmblob blob; security_current_getsecid_subj(&blob); @@ -497,8 +496,8 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (ret) return ret; - security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, + security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob); + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ad1080e01ba8..6df37398cfd8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1810,10 +1810,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.cred_getsecid(c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); -- 2.36.1