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Date:   Wed, 6 Jul 2022 11:06:58 -0400
From:   Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
To:     Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc:     Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
        Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
        linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] dm: Add verity helpers for LoadPin
Message-ID: <YsWlEmaQsIVUiKC0@redhat.com>
References: <20220627153526.3750341-1-mka@chromium.org>
 <20220627083512.v7.1.I3e928575a23481121e73286874c4c2bdb403355d@changeid>
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On Mon, Jun 27 2022 at 11:35P -0400,
Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> wrote:

> LoadPin limits loading of kernel modules, firmware and certain
> other files to a 'pinned' file system (typically a read-only
> rootfs). To provide more flexibility LoadPin is being extended
> to also allow loading these files from trusted dm-verity
> devices. For that purpose LoadPin can be provided with a list
> of verity root digests that it should consider as trusted.
> 
> Add a bunch of helpers to allow LoadPin to check whether a DM
> device is a trusted verity device. The new functions broadly
> fall in two categories: those that need access to verity
> internals (like the root digest), and the 'glue' between
> LoadPin and verity. The new file dm-verity-loadpin.c contains
> the glue functions.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>