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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id hc8-20020a170907168800b00718d1cddac1si30523201ejc.833.2022.07.07.10.21.43; Thu, 07 Jul 2022 10:22:09 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020 header.b=OKLVIS1y; dkim=neutral (no key) header.i=@linutronix.de header.s=2020e; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=linutronix.de Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236091AbiGGQwi (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:52:38 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:60602 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235727AbiGGQwh (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jul 2022 12:52:37 -0400 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [IPv6:2a0a:51c0:0:12e:550::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 09915564F6; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 09:52:35 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2022 16:52:32 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1657212753; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=nZoIB/3vTUqYv3qWPf/n6XJD0cOfsxNgHKA+qotDZ1Y=; b=OKLVIS1ybAHbuTFV7HIc069PIBo+CNDErOZ+RDS7Dvk2UxyhHSs6lloVWsmFtddnI8CQ6p d4trLBBE1tuqatqwsXh1e9yUofF8DqrPOcbjG+Rgu+i5pG6eWQzm7YbivcFITU0iJMcM6S /GcxGd28iemGUl9SHIJRQrK0F4fWClnbzyRSxNYjkX1ZDEIOA4JHPXbfUMMWqaQC210bZF jGc7bNEihVvuyS4QpMj/c+SVzKcFZePL2Qs3cRG4p8kF1RhCcrcWcpYj9QSTG66o3ZINQs CO4vqWJDntlKlhzSpeQPbqATt51eKdu6Fi/82i7VPQFa7z58Qyc3M5tDTkbz+A== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1657212753; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=nZoIB/3vTUqYv3qWPf/n6XJD0cOfsxNgHKA+qotDZ1Y=; b=FEpcIxSdqcd0gnDDPcyYVb9m7dAh0lcFNAvKqM20PCmvzwFbhoQanCqja/ihRNYzHT5MUe bnxXXWT+Hf5tYQBw== From: "tip-bot2 for Jonathan McDowell" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/boot] x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec Cc: Jonathan McDowell , Dave Hansen , Mimi Zohar , Baoquan He , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <165721275237.15455.6157055713679490274.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip: Commit-ID: 2faaa8f3ef16d794ecb28f9a7d9dca25cff98bb3 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/2faaa8f3ef16d794ecb28f9a7d9dca25cff98bb3 Author: Jonathan McDowell AuthorDate: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 08:36:12 Committer: Dave Hansen CommitterDate: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 15:45:55 -07:00 x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec On kexec file load, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) subsystem may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and measure it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the kexec call may also be measured by IMA. A remote attestation service can verify a TPM quote based on the TPM event log, the IMA measurement list and the TPM PCR data. This can be achieved only if the IMA measurement log is carried over from the current kernel to the next kernel across the kexec call. PowerPC and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a "linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to the new kernel. (Mimi, Baoquan, I haven't included your reviewed-bys because this has changed the section annotations to __init and Boris reasonably enough wants to make sure IMA folk are happy before taking this update.) Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar # IMA function Reviewed-by: Baoquan He Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YmKyvlF3my1yWTvK@noodles-fedora-PC23Y6EG Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yr1geLyslnjKck86@noodles-fedora.dhcp.thefacebook.com --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 9 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/of/kexec.c | 13 +---- include/linux/ima.h | 5 ++- include/linux/of.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 762a0b6..5465def 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2027,6 +2027,7 @@ config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE select BUILD_BIN2C + select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA depends on X86_64 depends on CRYPTO=y depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h index bea5cdc..ca0796a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define SETUP_APPLE_PROPERTIES 5 #define SETUP_JAILHOUSE 6 #define SETUP_CC_BLOB 7 +#define SETUP_IMA 8 #define SETUP_INDIRECT (1<<31) @@ -172,6 +173,14 @@ struct jailhouse_setup_data { } __attribute__((packed)) v2; } __attribute__((packed)); +/* + * IMA buffer setup data information from the previous kernel during kexec + */ +struct ima_setup_data { + __u64 addr; + __u64 size; +} __attribute__((packed)); + /* The so-called "zeropage" */ struct boot_params { struct screen_info screen_info; /* 0x000 */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c index f267205..9dac246 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c @@ -1017,10 +1017,10 @@ void __init e820__reserve_setup_data(void) e820__range_update(pa_data, sizeof(*data)+data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); /* - * SETUP_EFI is supplied by kexec and does not need to be - * reserved. + * SETUP_EFI and SETUP_IMA are supplied by kexec and do not need + * to be reserved. */ - if (data->type != SETUP_EFI) + if (data->type != SETUP_EFI && data->type != SETUP_IMA) e820__range_update_kexec(pa_data, sizeof(*data) + data->len, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 170d0fd..c63974e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -186,11 +186,38 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI */ +static void +setup_ima_state(const struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, + unsigned long params_load_addr, + unsigned int ima_setup_data_offset) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC + struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + ima_setup_data_offset; + unsigned long setup_data_phys; + struct ima_setup_data *ima; + + if (!image->ima_buffer_size) + return; + + sd->type = SETUP_IMA; + sd->len = sizeof(*ima); + + ima = (void *)sd + sizeof(struct setup_data); + ima->addr = image->ima_buffer_addr; + ima->size = image->ima_buffer_size; + + /* Add setup data */ + setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + ima_setup_data_offset; + sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data; + params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys; +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC */ +} + static int setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz, - unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset) + unsigned int setup_data_offset) { unsigned int nr_e820_entries; unsigned long long mem_k, start, end; @@ -245,8 +272,15 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, #ifdef CONFIG_EFI /* Setup EFI state */ setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, - efi_setup_data_offset); + setup_data_offset); + setup_data_offset += sizeof(struct setup_data) + + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); #endif + + /* Setup IMA log buffer state */ + setup_ima_state(image, params, params_load_addr, + setup_data_offset); + /* Setup EDD info */ memcpy(params->eddbuf, boot_params.eddbuf, EDDMAXNR * sizeof(struct edd_info)); @@ -403,6 +437,10 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel, sizeof(struct setup_data) + sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC)) + kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) + + sizeof(struct ima_setup_data); + params = kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!params) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c index 3ebb853..e21ad55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -145,6 +146,11 @@ __visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init; __visible unsigned long mmu_cr4_features __ro_after_init = X86_CR4_PAE; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +static phys_addr_t ima_kexec_buffer_phys; +static size_t ima_kexec_buffer_size; +#endif + /* Boot loader ID and version as integers, for the benefit of proc_dointvec */ int bootloader_type, bootloader_version; @@ -335,6 +341,60 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */ +static void __init add_early_ima_buffer(u64 phys_addr) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + struct ima_setup_data *data; + + data = early_memremap(phys_addr + sizeof(struct setup_data), sizeof(*data)); + if (!data) { + pr_warn("setup: failed to memremap ima_setup_data entry\n"); + return; + } + + if (data->size) { + memblock_reserve(data->addr, data->size); + ima_kexec_buffer_phys = data->addr; + ima_kexec_buffer_size = data->size; + } + + early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data)); +#else + pr_warn("Passed IMA kexec data, but CONFIG_IMA not set. Ignoring.\n"); +#endif +} + +#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE) +int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) +{ + int rc; + + if (!ima_kexec_buffer_size) + return -ENOENT; + + rc = memblock_phys_free(ima_kexec_buffer_phys, + ima_kexec_buffer_size); + if (rc) + return rc; + + ima_kexec_buffer_phys = 0; + ima_kexec_buffer_size = 0; + + return 0; +} + +int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) +{ + if (!ima_kexec_buffer_size) + return -ENOENT; + + *addr = __va(ima_kexec_buffer_phys); + *size = ima_kexec_buffer_size; + + return 0; +} +#endif + static void __init parse_setup_data(void) { struct setup_data *data; @@ -360,6 +420,9 @@ static void __init parse_setup_data(void) case SETUP_EFI: parse_efi_setup(pa_data, data_len); break; + case SETUP_IMA: + add_early_ima_buffer(pa_data); + break; default: break; } diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c index 8d374cc..f2e58dd 100644 --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ static int do_get_kexec_buffer(const void *prop, int len, unsigned long *addr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC /** * ima_get_kexec_buffer - get IMA buffer from the previous kernel * @addr: On successful return, set to point to the buffer contents. @@ -122,16 +124,13 @@ static int do_get_kexec_buffer(const void *prop, int len, unsigned long *addr, * * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on error. */ -int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) +int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) { int ret, len; unsigned long tmp_addr; size_t tmp_size; const void *prop; - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC)) - return -ENOTSUPP; - prop = of_get_property(of_chosen, "linux,ima-kexec-buffer", &len); if (!prop) return -ENOENT; @@ -149,16 +148,13 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) /** * ima_free_kexec_buffer - free memory used by the IMA buffer */ -int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) +int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) { int ret; unsigned long addr; size_t size; struct property *prop; - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC)) - return -ENOTSUPP; - prop = of_find_property(of_chosen, "linux,ima-kexec-buffer", NULL); if (!prop) return -ENOENT; @@ -173,6 +169,7 @@ int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void) return memblock_phys_free(addr, size); } +#endif /** * remove_ima_buffer - remove the IMA buffer property and reservation from @fdt diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 426b174..81708ca 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label, #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC +int __init ima_free_kexec_buffer(void); +int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); diff --git a/include/linux/of.h b/include/linux/of.h index 04971e8..c2f58d2 100644 --- a/include/linux/of.h +++ b/include/linux/of.h @@ -441,8 +441,6 @@ void *of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt(const struct kimage *image, unsigned long initrd_load_addr, unsigned long initrd_len, const char *cmdline, size_t extra_fdt_size); -int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); -int ima_free_kexec_buffer(void); #else /* CONFIG_OF */ static inline void of_core_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c index 1375313..419dc40 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image) /* * Restore the measurement list from the previous kernel. */ -void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) +void __init ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) { void *kexec_buffer = NULL; size_t kexec_buffer_size = 0;