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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id qf23-20020a1709077f1700b0072b5ce83732si6037810ejc.419.2022.07.12.12.39.00; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 12:39:25 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=H4mWb3iF; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234132AbiGLSxQ (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:53:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56436 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234651AbiGLSwd (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:52:33 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E7D4DE6810; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:45:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CAF28B81BC2; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 18:45:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D6FF2C341C8; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 18:45:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1657651504; bh=xp4hUKui/6IFtmVwexHXR6RltV7kLR8FPniaMYkkTbU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=H4mWb3iFTephtiKXGWOzmBMOQwqdZBV4h+bvN/Jf95RA0HAKoLemYBaFirGOKnNxH dXJnYd0BngF2ti+f4vyJFm5fuFDu/lOVkDi5+a3yf2wGTJMr94iT3ehveFGSbz15a2 GF9QbtjKuBGzx/O2MB0NHk6X6osBiIU0LRKLxDxs= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips , Alexandre Chartre , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Poimboeuf , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo , Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 5.10 096/130] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:02 +0200 Message-Id: <20220712183250.893083352@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.0 In-Reply-To: <20220712183246.394947160@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220712183246.394947160@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Alexandre Chartre commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream. Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack. [peterz: add hygon] [kim: invert parity; fam15h] Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -426,5 +426,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ #define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */ +#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); } +static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -1962,6 +1967,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA: return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf); + case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: + return retbleed_show_state(buf); + default: break; } @@ -2018,4 +2026,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); +} #endif --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1092,16 +1092,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ {} }; +#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \ + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) + #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues) +#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + +#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \ + VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist) + #define SRBDS BIT(0) /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO BIT(1) /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */ #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) +/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ +#define RETBLEED BIT(3) static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), @@ -1134,6 +1145,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), + + VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED), + VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED), {} }; @@ -1235,6 +1251,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED); + if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) return; --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -572,6 +572,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data( return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); @@ -582,6 +588,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, @@ -594,6 +601,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, &dev_attr_srbds.attr, &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, + &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, NULL }; --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct dev extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,