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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id lk13-20020a17090b33cd00b001f0734f3988si1220784pjb.164.2022.07.12.12.42.06; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 12:42:18 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b="lKypg/Fz"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234790AbiGLSxw (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:53:52 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57562 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234750AbiGLSxP (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jul 2022 14:53:15 -0400 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6808E683C; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 11:45:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4024260C8E; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 18:45:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BFA72C3411C; Tue, 12 Jul 2022 18:45:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1657651517; bh=AlwIaBZ2g8sMPWPN0Jz1aONq8AbTKSIosVdoN6z6qbo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=lKypg/FzehwlEdTIA2GdaZGFK5wa2kfYQTJ0nbK1M1QAZiSCg/kmtTp2Pwc/2Z19N uVOSq5IYKbb8UfGjIe4UEmFpKmquvuQVW+FSRUkFiiC9jtARLNh76cXMryTYoSp8FQ yinAA3YcF53y/Q0nSkYBNAVRZUyu7Ym8o1HZHq/o= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Poimboeuf , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo , Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 5.10 100/130] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:06 +0200 Message-Id: <20220712183251.076745793@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.0 In-Reply-To: <20220712183246.394947160@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220712183246.394947160@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Peter Zijlstra commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream. Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx] [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S] [cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 17 ++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 - 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include /* @@ -309,6 +311,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent #endif /* + * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2. + * + * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers + * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET + * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction) + * + * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value, + * which is used on the paranoid paths. + * + * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set. + */ +.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + rdmsr + shl $32, %rdx + or %rdx, %rax + mov %rax, \save_reg + test $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax + jz .Ldo_wrmsr_\@ + lfence + jmp .Lend_\@ +.Ldo_wrmsr_\@: +.endif + + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX) + * regs. Must be called after the last RET. + */ +.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS + movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + +.ifnb \save_reg + mov \save_reg, %rdx +.else + movq PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx + andl $(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx +.endif + + movl %edx, %eax + shr $32, %rdx + wrmsr +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths. * * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -102,7 +102,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -118,6 +117,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_h /* IRQs are off. */ movq %rax, %rdi movq %rsp, %rsi + + /* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */ + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */ /* @@ -192,6 +196,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_h * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here. */ syscall_return_via_sysret: + IBRS_EXIT POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 /* @@ -569,6 +574,7 @@ __irqentry_text_end: SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return) SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + IBRS_EXIT #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */ testb $3, CS(%rsp) @@ -889,6 +895,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC @@ -912,7 +921,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * be retrieved from a kernel internal table. */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 - UNTRAIN_RET /* * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. @@ -934,7 +942,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * is needed here. */ SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx - RET + jmp .Lparanoid_gsbase_done .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs: /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */ @@ -953,8 +961,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) xorl %ebx, %ebx swapgs .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase: - FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY +.Lparanoid_gsbase_done: + + /* + * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like + * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register. + */ + IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15 + UNTRAIN_RET + RET SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) @@ -976,9 +992,19 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * * Y User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally + * + * R14 - old CR3 + * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) UNWIND_HINT_REGS + + /* + * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access + * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable. + */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* * The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires * kernel GSBASE. @@ -1025,9 +1051,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY /* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs: + /* Put us onto the real thread stack. */ popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */ movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */ @@ -1081,6 +1109,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) SWAPGS FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax + IBRS_ENTER UNTRAIN_RET /* @@ -1176,7 +1205,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) movq %rsp, %rdx movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8 - UNTRAIN_RET pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */ pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */ @@ -1187,6 +1215,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx) ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're @@ -1409,6 +1440,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi: movq $-1, %rsi call exc_nmi + /* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */ + IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15 + /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs. */ -#include "calling.h" #include #include #include @@ -18,6 +17,8 @@ #include #include +#include "calling.h" + .section .entry.text, "ax" /* @@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - UNTRAIN_RET /* * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that @@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_af cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether @@ -213,7 +216,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) - UNTRAIN_RET /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER32_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ @@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_aft UNWIND_HINT_REGS + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_fast_syscall_32 /* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */ @@ -269,6 +274,8 @@ sysret32_from_system_call: */ STACKLEAK_ERASE + IBRS_EXIT + movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */ @@ -380,7 +387,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */ .Lint80_keep_stack: - UNTRAIN_RET pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */ pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */ @@ -413,6 +419,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) cld + IBRS_ENTER + UNTRAIN_RET + movq %rsp, %rdi call do_int80_syscall_32 jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ /* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */