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Message-ID: <847ef193-71a7-9714-be20-2cbb654e9c09@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed, 20 Jul 2022 13:24:34 -0700
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] apparmor: correct config reference to intended one
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To:     Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
References: <20220720120443.16518-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
From:   John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Organization: Canonical
In-Reply-To: <20220720120443.16518-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
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Precedence: bulk

On 7/20/22 05:04, Lukas Bulwahn wrote:
> Commit 5bfcbd22ee4e ("apparmor: Enable tuning of policy paranoid load for
> embedded systems") introduces the config SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD,
> but then refers in the code to SECURITY_PARANOID_LOAD; note the missing
> APPARMOR in the middle.
> 
> Correct this to the introduced and intended config option.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>

thanks, I have pulled this into apparmor-next

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

> ---
>   security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 090a20805664..e29cade7b662 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
>    * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
>    * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
>    */
> -bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_PARANOID_LOAD);
> +bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
>   module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
>   
>   static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);