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Date:   Thu, 21 Jul 2022 21:19:06 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To:     "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Cc:     Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM
 guest private memory
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On Thu, Jul 21, 2022, Gupta, Pankaj wrote:
> 
> Hi Sean, Chao,
> 
> While attempting to solve the pre-boot guest payload/firmware population
> into private memory for SEV SNP, retrieved this thread. Have question below:
> 
> > > > Requirements & Gaps
> > > > -------------------------------------
> > > >    - Confidential computing(CC): TDX/SEV/CCA
> > > >      * Need support both explicit/implicit conversions.
> > > >      * Need support only destructive conversion at runtime.
> > > >      * The current patch should just work, but prefer to have pre-boot guest
> > > >        payload/firmware population into private memory for performance.
> > > 
> > > Not just performance in the case of SEV, it's needed there because firmware
> > > only supports in-place encryption of guest memory, there's no mechanism to
> > > provide a separate buffer to load into guest memory at pre-boot time. I
> > > think you're aware of this but wanted to point that out just in case.
> > 
> > I view it as a performance problem because nothing stops KVM from copying from
> > userspace into the private fd during the SEV ioctl().  What's missing is the
> > ability for userspace to directly initialze the private fd, which may or may not
> > avoid an extra memcpy() depending on how clever userspace is.
> Can you please elaborate more what you see as a performance problem? And
> possible ways to solve it?

Oh, I'm not saying there actually _is_ a performance problem.  What I'm saying is
that in-place encryption is not a functional requirement, which means it's purely
an optimization, and thus we should other bother supporting in-place encryption
_if_ it would solve a performane bottleneck.