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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id le14-20020a170906ae0e00b0072fac45320dsi800900ejb.357.2022.07.22.01.39.24; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 01:39:48 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=CCJKmNZS; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234909AbiGVIWN (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 04:22:13 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48800 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230490AbiGVIWM (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 04:22:12 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5EDCD9E29F; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 01:22:11 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 112CBB8273C; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 08:22:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A427EC341C6; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 08:22:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1658478128; bh=XGwOBIQ70b38PDak8j4LkJrvWTb0yE8WzAWK9ZxMX4Y=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=CCJKmNZSo0xL/TYMV2O0Ody1OFAoC7gA7iwMj9taKid7LZJ8uMkZUiXG+aKiVHAG0 kVE4bHC3UBv5XXr2yhF27+4y27ZEI27zTB7dczgp3h3vpnq62QBoTxKnR8fvsO3e/1 JmAGrMrEhSajJegpu6zum04O7kpgPsC82/xnxm9YcqtBRDGcCWbvTHz6C3U1kOQUJ6 Htm1f21uYIgXWE8NbUio/BbgUJMT7Iby9CvcvJDyaNpw8+qufM5g0UnGWS8eeE/Qa9 7bz4OfWlBbPxGPlkSZSKYdhdp9bYgYB/Bki9jzy4PB0q8LZi1rBmnPTAgZl58B3BXp 5rwVkSjMUOjPA== Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 10:21:59 +0200 From: Christian Brauner To: Frederick Lawler Cc: kpsingh@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, kafai@fb.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org, shuah@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@cloudflare.com, cgzones@googlemail.com, karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() Message-ID: <20220722082159.jgvw7jgds3qwfyqk@wittgenstein> References: <20220721172808.585539-1-fred@cloudflare.com> <20220721172808.585539-2-fred@cloudflare.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220721172808.585539-2-fred@cloudflare.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jul 21, 2022 at 12:28:05PM -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote: > Preventing user namespace (privileged or otherwise) creation comes in a > few of forms in order of granularity: > > 1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl > 2. OS specific patch(es) > 3. CONFIG_USER_NS > > To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a > good candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and > it is called before create_user_ns(): > > cred = prepare_creds() > security_prepare_creds() > call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... > if (cred) > create_user_ns(cred) > > Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare > credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. Therefore > introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying > userns_create LSM hook. > > This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy > against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, > otherwise an error is returned. > > Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler > > --- Nice and straightforward, Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft)