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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 190-20020a6217c7000000b0052b206007bcsi5047719pfx.237.2022.07.22.02.51.17; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:51:32 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=R3yI+YHs; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235591AbiGVJPD (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:15:03 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:40850 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235584AbiGVJOM (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:14:12 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F000DAF947; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:11:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6FFB1B827B2; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 09:11:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8D3BDC341CF; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 09:10:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1658481059; bh=h88RRdhALqRqeQGkQu8w5tHHC/J2GjUZi8h4KKxYYFo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=R3yI+YHsmVcj4ibO9+XpBJfyR3D+iA/Lw/6VEEXRcKzJMOX/2bjebPOBxdcMp5Rnt yx91Qub3A5LeUjsZoMdZFJk5GzFzpd3YHmu/yMnVKSVsWdO0BkWNVkTcPa5GYrMmu9 S6Pc+pYPSORHtDAS+HLR1OcRt7Wh5iPGB4WEp8XA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Poimboeuf , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Subject: [PATCH 5.18 39/70] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:07:34 +0200 Message-Id: <20220722090652.907999861@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1 In-Reply-To: <20220722090650.665513668@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220722090650.665513668@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo commit a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e upstream. Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET instruction. Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0. This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END. If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be reported. There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances: - UNTRAIN_RET itself - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov [cascardo: tools/objtool/builtin-check.c no link option validation] [cascardo: tools/objtool/check.c opts.ibt is ibt] [cascardo: tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h leave unret option as bool, no struct opts] [cascardo: objtool is still called from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 6 - arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 12 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h | 4 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 5 arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 10 - include/linux/objtool.h | 3 scripts/link-vmlinux.sh | 3 tools/include/linux/objtool.h | 3 tools/objtool/builtin-check.c | 3 tools/objtool/check.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h | 2 tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h | 11 + 13 files changed, 220 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR swapgs @@ -1088,6 +1088,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry) .Lerror_entry_done_lfence: FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */ + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END RET .Lbstep_iret: --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * 0(%ebp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ SWAPGS @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSENTER_compat) * 0(%esp) arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* Interrupts are off on entry. */ swapgs @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat) * ebp arg6 */ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * Interrupts are off on entry. --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -82,6 +82,17 @@ #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE /* + * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should + * eventually turn into it's own annotation. + */ +.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + nop +#endif +.endm + +/* * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2 * attack. @@ -131,6 +142,7 @@ */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind_hints.h @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1 .endm +.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY + UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1 +.endm + .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0 .if \base == %rsp .if \indirect --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS @@ -393,6 +395,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16 + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END /* * The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the * vector number. @@ -442,6 +445,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8 ENDBR + ANNOTATE_UNRET_END + /* Build pt_regs */ PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(xen_read_cr2_direct); .macro xen_pv_trap name SYM_CODE_START(xen_\name) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR pop %rcx pop %r11 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_retu /* Normal 64-bit system call target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) /* 32-bit compat syscall target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) /* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR /* * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) - UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY + UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY ENDBR lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax --- a/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION --- a/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh +++ b/scripts/link-vmlinux.sh @@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ objtool_link() if is_enabled CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION; then objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --noinstr" + if is_enabled CONFIG_RETPOLINE; then + objtoolopt="${objtoolopt} --unret" + fi fi if [ -n "${objtoolopt}" ]; then --- a/tools/include/linux/objtool.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/objtool.h @@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint { * * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function. * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation. + * + * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc. */ #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL 0 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS 1 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL 2 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC 3 +#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY 4 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION --- a/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/builtin-check.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, lto, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, dryrun, - ibt; + ibt, unret; static const char * const check_usage[] = { "objtool check [] file.o", @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = { OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"), OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"), OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"), + OPT_BOOLEAN(0, "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"), OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"), OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"), OPT_BOOLEAN('a', "uaccess", &uaccess, "enable uaccess checking"), --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -2031,16 +2031,24 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objt insn->hint = true; - if (ibt && hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) { struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset); - if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL && - insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { - WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", - insn->sec, insn->offset); + if (sym && sym->bind == STB_GLOBAL) { + if (ibt && insn->type != INSN_ENDBR && !insn->noendbr) { + WARN_FUNC("UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS without ENDBR", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + } + + insn->entry = 1; } } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY) { + hint->type = UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL; + insn->entry = 1; + } + if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC) { insn->cfi = &func_cfi; continue; @@ -2115,8 +2123,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct o if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC && insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC && - insn->type != INSN_RETURN) { - WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret", + insn->type != INSN_RETURN && + insn->type != INSN_NOP) { + WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret/nop", insn->sec, insn->offset); return -1; } @@ -3412,8 +3421,8 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo return 1; } - visited = 1 << state.uaccess; - if (insn->visited) { + visited = VISITED_BRANCH << state.uaccess; + if (insn->visited & VISITED_BRANCH_MASK) { if (!insn->hint && !insn_cfi_match(insn, &state.cfi)) return 1; @@ -3642,6 +3651,145 @@ static int validate_unwind_hints(struct return warnings; } +/* + * Validate rethunk entry constraint: must untrain RET before the first RET. + * + * Follow every branch (intra-function) and ensure ANNOTATE_UNRET_END comes + * before an actual RET instruction. + */ +static int validate_entry(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) +{ + struct instruction *next, *dest; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for (;;) { + next = next_insn_to_validate(file, insn); + + if (insn->visited & VISITED_ENTRY) + return 0; + + insn->visited |= VISITED_ENTRY; + + if (!insn->ignore_alts && !list_empty(&insn->alts)) { + struct alternative *alt; + bool skip_orig = false; + + list_for_each_entry(alt, &insn->alts, list) { + if (alt->skip_orig) + skip_orig = true; + + ret = validate_entry(file, alt->insn); + if (ret) { + if (backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(alt)", insn); + return ret; + } + } + + if (skip_orig) + return 0; + } + + switch (insn->type) { + + case INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC: + case INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC_CONDITIONAL: + WARN_FUNC("early indirect call", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL: + case INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL: + if (!is_sibling_call(insn)) { + if (!insn->jump_dest) { + WARN_FUNC("unresolved jump target after linking?!?", + insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + ret = validate_entry(file, insn->jump_dest); + if (ret) { + if (backtrace) { + BT_FUNC("(branch%s)", insn, + insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ? "-cond" : ""); + } + return ret; + } + + if (insn->type == INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL) + return 0; + + break; + } + + /* fallthrough */ + case INSN_CALL: + dest = find_insn(file, insn->call_dest->sec, + insn->call_dest->offset); + if (!dest) { + WARN("Unresolved function after linking!?: %s", + insn->call_dest->name); + return -1; + } + + ret = validate_entry(file, dest); + if (ret) { + if (backtrace) + BT_FUNC("(call)", insn); + return ret; + } + /* + * If a call returns without error, it must have seen UNTRAIN_RET. + * Therefore any non-error return is a success. + */ + return 0; + + case INSN_RETURN: + WARN_FUNC("RET before UNTRAIN", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return 1; + + case INSN_NOP: + if (insn->retpoline_safe) + return 0; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + if (!next) { + WARN_FUNC("teh end!", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return -1; + } + insn = next; + } + + return warnings; +} + +/* + * Validate that all branches starting at 'insn->entry' encounter UNRET_END + * before RET. + */ +static int validate_unret(struct objtool_file *file) +{ + struct instruction *insn; + int ret, warnings = 0; + + for_each_insn(file, insn) { + if (!insn->entry) + continue; + + ret = validate_entry(file, insn); + if (ret < 0) { + WARN_FUNC("Failed UNRET validation", insn->sec, insn->offset); + return ret; + } + warnings += ret; + } + + return warnings; +} + static int validate_retpoline(struct objtool_file *file) { struct instruction *insn; @@ -4005,6 +4153,17 @@ int check(struct objtool_file *file) goto out; warnings += ret; + if (unret) { + /* + * Must be after validate_branch() and friends, it plays + * further games with insn->visited. + */ + ret = validate_unret(file); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + warnings += ret; + } + if (ibt) { ret = validate_ibt(file); if (ret < 0) --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ extern const struct option check_options[]; extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats, lto, vmlinux, mcount, noinstr, backup, sls, dryrun, - ibt; + ibt, unret; extern int cmd_parse_options(int argc, const char **argv, const char * const usage[]); --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/check.h @@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ struct instruction { ignore_alts : 1, hint : 1, retpoline_safe : 1, - noendbr : 1; - /* 2 bit hole */ + noendbr : 1, + entry : 1; + /* 1 bit hole */ + s8 instr; u8 visited; /* u8 hole */ @@ -69,6 +71,11 @@ struct instruction { struct cfi_state *cfi; }; +#define VISITED_BRANCH 0x01 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_UACCESS 0x02 +#define VISITED_BRANCH_MASK 0x03 +#define VISITED_ENTRY 0x04 + static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn) { return insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ||