Received: by 2002:ac0:da4c:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id a12csp459341imi; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:51:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1t11u1V/CGCSCeniZb8Kx9q4KK94W0PGxUSFWjP0b4qBCZv++PL/Y6VMXGb8cn//IJJG/Lg X-Received: by 2002:a17:907:d92:b0:72e:e968:7fa1 with SMTP id go18-20020a1709070d9200b0072ee9687fa1mr2474920ejc.731.1658483498264; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:51:38 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1658483498; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=IvkIMf7UqW9pwsLdcAhCF1+9xob7JRdjBfxTm8/iRBiJ17YUW9842/KeVvKr24U4WV CvbjfnJGHL4wF9GXcOBYQ4yX3l9HqzNfg+uTpWSxOoeuLZVuVNdTjLON9MxgX6hAtnxN GTw5qzv4JFl5ArQo1+sAj0l72+7D8zK3ofl2xYpxRIoELjxQLBQGCPcZNSXV62rmtme4 gl4aLkiXka/9W0Rv620P/tmeEqb8pTKYDpe6HZbifrdm/PWmwMw+pYzd9ZtSzD9zF85p NzWsmQdixv91qaBbyhiHNo2NhrIn1A2JFtGOlx2eUm3Ijd/z8ALmDFBWuxEg8aiyQJ0i +zfQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=mk3Kfuok3zVWgPcmFN7paUnUBeWJrBITGODmy3sMhWc=; b=nvapwADAyr7BCC4M3XetMl80GmCQpeHhIcwruvQAOYjfStAZt0uvUOyJcj0Z4/qL+A VlOcQI+7fk/7Djg/4/7M8UjgoTMxbOYyVIpiXVxfG0YsfIJH5XjNhUJ+sw3Aed6AGinG Qpcqi0E/9MqWmV3tMGK+ILYsY7JrXwNqkt1PYsT/i4RlJX9GQgM0mN7cqN9Uk2zVx11I Ls/LEHdO/51TcgmkvXyAj86ZOsAQ5OcxY9ueQfcMKWqcVaR9JVUH6rHbp8q504ntCZuT ZMUmd3aEPiWyIR48Fa3d0zDINain/CITkAfCX09m2CN+Rne0F/K1kMdcE+ZqSmpD39Nf P9cg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=HmIsOq2U; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Return-Path: Received: from out1.vger.email (out1.vger.email. [2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d6-20020a056402516600b0043a41583a03si4885074ede.71.2022.07.22.02.51.14; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:51:38 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=HmIsOq2U; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236450AbiGVJ3C (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:29:02 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50370 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236408AbiGVJ2m (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:28:42 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60948B8518; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 02:17:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 615D0B827BC; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 09:17:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D68E8C341C6; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 09:17:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1658481474; bh=ht/zw+tJsdLI5zMA2BjnKf2FhyrjDAtiyH10+522ZUY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=HmIsOq2UDgVoiYBTC9lDUegSCL4HNQtQTwOtizc5NozOxtlXxzMrEwrCSH/Adri1p WUJcyBQCuSdcCXiN2mHZm2bmfv6TXFtHEWTSYw/2yJkogAVDMQDS7Qlq0y2SxNe/HS Cf9m+vWtMdphvyo2yxvycxUUz91G5LSCMmvqWezc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Guenter Roeck , Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Borislav Petkov , Josh Poimboeuf , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:11:56 +0200 Message-Id: <20220722091137.929354267@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1 In-Reply-To: <20220722091133.320803732@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220722091133.320803732@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo commit 51a6fa0732d6be6a44e0032752ad2ac10d67c796 upstream. When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_thunk_64.S @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include .text .code64 @@ -63,7 +64,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__efi64_thunk) 1: movq 24(%rsp), %rsp pop %rbx pop %rbp - RET + ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE + ret + int3 .code32 2: pushl $__KERNEL_CS