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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a23-20020a05640213d700b0043a9ba73187si5081066edx.289.2022.08.01.07.30.05; Mon, 01 Aug 2022 07:30:30 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=arm.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232482AbiHAOS5 (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 1 Aug 2022 10:18:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36542 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230109AbiHAOS4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Aug 2022 10:18:56 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B364E22BF6; Mon, 1 Aug 2022 07:18:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 263EC1FB; Mon, 1 Aug 2022 07:18:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bogus (unknown [10.57.11.114]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9BE433F73B; Mon, 1 Aug 2022 07:18:53 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 15:18:50 +0100 From: Sudeep Holla To: Jassi Brar Cc: Jassi Brar , Rob Herring , Sudeep Holla , Krzysztof Kozlowski , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] dt-bindings: mailbox: arm,mhu: Make secure interrupt optional Message-ID: <20220801141850.yqa4kal5gyc4l7pj@bogus> References: <20220728190810.1290857-1-robh@kernel.org> <20220729111051.5me4vklrzskvsj4w@bogus> <20220801102309.efvmde2ackh3vyg4@bogus> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Aug 01, 2022 at 08:57:52AM -0500, Jassi Brar wrote: > On Mon, 1 Aug 2022 at 05:23, Sudeep Holla wrote: > > On Fri, Jul 29, 2022 at 10:18:04AM -0500, Jassi Brar wrote: > > > > > > Anyways I can insert a module that requests this channel and bring down > > > > the system as accessing anything configure secure from non-secure side > > > > on Juno results in system hang/error. > > > > > > > Why go to those lengths? These are already simpler options available ;-) > > > 1) while (1) ; // preferably in some atomic context > > > 2) *((int *) 0) = 0; // you might want to iterate over offset for > > > guaranteed results > > > 3) Slightly more work, but you also have the opportunity to erase your > > > storage device > > > > I know these simple methods but can I hinder secure side services with > > these ? > > > Ideally, no. And neither if we enumerate the secure-channel in dt and driver. > > See, even if you remove support for the secure channel in the kernel, > a doped super-user could always insmod a module that attempts to > access the secure address space that you want to "hide". > True, generally they should have put this in a separate page/range so TZ could program accordingly and prohibit any access ????. -- Regards, Sudeep