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From:   Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Date:   Wed, 3 Aug 2022 13:48:37 -0700
Message-ID: <CAE=gft4jTQY1N5X=Yyg6g6-e0EBPHKhnQxcX02NZU0mZxaTvwA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR
 values in creation data
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
        Daniil Lunev <dlunev@google.com>, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
        "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
        Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
        Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
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On Tue, Aug 2, 2022 at 4:00 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 04, 2022 at 04:20:56PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > index aa108bea6739b3..2975827c01bec0 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > @@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ enum {
> >       Opt_hash,
> >       Opt_policydigest,
> >       Opt_policyhandle,
> > +     Opt_creationpcrs,
> >  };
> >
> >  static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> > @@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> >       {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
> >       {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
> >       {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
> > +     {Opt_creationpcrs, "creationpcrs=%s"},
> >       {Opt_err, NULL}
> >  };
> >
> > @@ -858,6 +860,13 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
> >                               return -EINVAL;
> >                       opt->policyhandle = handle;
> >                       break;
> > +             case Opt_creationpcrs:
> > +                     if (!tpm2)
> > +                             return -EINVAL;
> > +                     res = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 16, &opt->creation_pcrs);
> > +                     if (res < 0)
> > +                             return -EINVAL;
> > +                     break;
>
> I thought that TPM1 is deprecated.  Are you sure you need more TPM1 features?

It seems that trusted_tpm1.c is not just TPM1 functions, but also
common functions that call TPM2 primitives. A few of these functions
(like this getoptions()) seem to even error out if !tpm_is_tpm2(chip).

-Evan