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Date:   Wed, 3 Aug 2022 21:49:50 +0000
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To:     Daniil Lunev <dlunev@chromium.org>
Cc:     Zdenek Kabelac <zdenek.kabelac@gmail.com>,
        Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>,
        Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
        Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>,
        Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH 1/1] dm: add message command to disallow
 device open
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On Thu, Aug 04, 2022 at 06:44:53AM +1000, Daniil Lunev wrote:
> > Have you also considered unlinking the device node (/dev/dm-$idx) from the
> > filesystem after it has been set up for swap?
> Yes, the node can be re-linked with mknod, thus is not a suitable solution.

I thought you were trying to defend against path traversal attacks, not
arbitrary code execution?  If your threat model includes arbitrary code
execution by root, you really need to be using SELinux.

- Eric