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Date:   Wed, 3 Aug 2022 21:36:19 -0700
From:   Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
To:     linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     dan.j.williams@intel.com, bwidawsk@kernel.org,
        Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com, ira.weiny@intel.com,
        alison.schofield@intel.com, vishal.l.verma@intel.com,
        a.manzanares@samsung.com, mcgrof@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dave.jiang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] cxl: BG operations and device sanitation
Message-ID: <20220804043619.ko5luhppbvcoh4s5@offworld>
References: <20220804045029.2905056-1-dave@stgolabs.net>
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*sigh* Cc Dave.

On Wed, 03 Aug 2022, Davidlohr Bueso wrote:

>Hello,
>
>The following is a followup to some of the discussions around CXL device security
>and sanitation[0, 1]. It is marked as RFC mostly to see if the background handling
>will satisfy all users, not just sanitize/overwrite. For example there has been ideas
>to avoid command hogging the device and/or interleaving scan media regions instead
>of all in one, etc. More details in each patch, but:
>
>Patch 1 adds the required background cmd handling bits. While this is currently
>only polling, it would be good to know if there are any fundamental blockers for
>supporting irqs (beyond just background ops) between PCIe and CXL. For example,
>are there any requirements/difficulties that is not the standard MSI/MSI-X PCI
>vector allocation + devm_request_irq()? I have not looked at this into details but
>it the topic has come up in the past as delicate', iirc.
>
>Patch 2 implements the sanitation commands (overwrite and secure erase).
>
>As for testing, while I used the mock device to test the secure erase command, I
>ended up hacking up a prototype[2] for qemu to support overwrite and bg commands.
>So while the some of the paths this series introduces have been exercised, there
>is of course a lot more to do.
>
>Applies against Dave's cxl-security branch[2] which deals with the pmem-only bits.
>
>Thanks,
>Davidlohr
>
>[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220708172455.gi37dh3od4w5lqrd@offworld/
>[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/165791918718.2491387.4203738301057301285.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com/
>[2]: https://github.com/davidlohr/qemu/commit/64a93a5b824b59d3b547f06f7fbb1269fb4790ce
>[3]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/djiang/linux.git/log/?h=cxl-security
>
>Davidlohr Bueso (2):
>  cxl/mbox: Add background operation handling machinery
>  cxl/mem: Support sanitation commands
>
> Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  19 ++
> drivers/cxl/core/core.h                 |   2 +-
> drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 304 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
> drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               |  58 +++++
> drivers/cxl/core/port.c                 |   9 +-
> drivers/cxl/cxl.h                       |   8 +
> drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  65 ++++-
> drivers/cxl/pci.c                       |   3 +-
> drivers/cxl/pmem.c                      |   5 +-
> drivers/cxl/security.c                  |  13 +-
> include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h            |   2 +
> 11 files changed, 461 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
>--
>2.37.1
>