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Date:   Sat, 6 Aug 2022 21:21:01 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To:     Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc:     Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Daniil Lunev <dlunev@google.com>, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
        "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
        Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
        Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Hao Wu <hao.wu@rubrik.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
        Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, axelj <axelj@axis.com>,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation
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On Thu, Aug 04, 2022 at 02:55:35PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 3, 2022 at 5:59 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 11:36:43AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 3:33 PM Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > > One more bump here, as we'd really love to get encrypted hibernation
> > > > to a form upstream would accept if at all possible. We were
> > > > considering landing this in our Chrome OS tree for now, then coming
> > > > back in a couple months with a "we've been baking this ourselves and
> > > > it's going so great, oooh yeah". I'm not sure if upstream would find
> > > > that compelling or not. But in any case, some guidance towards making
> > > > this more upstream friendly would be well appreciated.
> > > >
> > > > One thing I realized in attempting to pick this myself is that the
> > > > trusted key blob format has moved to ASN.1. So I should really move
> > > > the creation ticket to the new ASN.1 format (if I can figure out the
> > > > right OID for that piece), which would allow me to drop a lot of the
> > > > ugly stuff in tpm2_unpack_blob(). Maybe if I get no other comments
> > > > I'll work on that and resend.
> > >
> > > I've been revamping my TPM-backed verified hibernation implementation
> > > based on this work, so I'd definitely be enthusiastic about it being
> > > mergeable.
> >
> > BTW, is it tested with QEMU + swtpm?
> 
> For myself, so far I've been testing on a recent Intel Chromebook. The
> H1 (aka cr50) security chip on modern chromebooks implements a subset
> [1] of TPM2.0, and is exposed through the standard TPM APIs in the
> kernel. I can make sure to test on Qemu as well, is there anything in
> particular I should look out for?

I was just thinking what I could use for testing

BR, Jarkko