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From:   "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Date:   Tue, 09 Aug 2022 16:52:06 -0500
In-Reply-To: <f38216d8-8ee4-d6fd-a5b1-0d21013e09c6@schaufler-ca.com> (Casey
        Schaufler's message of "Tue, 9 Aug 2022 10:43:30 -0700")
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
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Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> writes:

> Smack has no interest in using the proposed hook because user namespaces
> are neither subjects nor objects. They are collections of DAC and/or
> privilege configuration alternatives. Or something like that. From the
> viewpoint of a security module that only implements old fashioned MAC
> there is no value in constraining user namespaces.

The goal is to simply enable things that become safe when you don't have
to worry about confusing setuid executables.

> SELinux, on the other hand, seeks to be comprehensive well beyond
> controlling accesses between subjects and objects. Asking the question
> "should there be a control on this operation?" seems sufficient to justify
> adding the control to SELinux policy. This is characteristic of
> "Fine Grain" control.

I see that from a theoretical standpoint.  On the flip side I prefer
arguments grounded in something more than what an abstract framework
could appreciate.  We are so far from any theoretical purity in the
linux kernel that I can't see theoretical purity being enough to justify
a decision like this.

> So I'm of two minds on this. I don't need the hook, but I also understand
> why SELinux and BPF want it. I don't necessarily agree with their logic,
> but it is consistent with existing behavior. Any system that uses either
> of those security modules needs to be ready for unexpected denials based
> on any potential security concern. Keeping namespaces completely orthogonal
> to LSM seems doomed to failure eventually.

I can cross that bridge when there is a healthy conversation about such
a change.

Too often I get "ouch! Creating a user namespace was used as the easiest
way to exploit a security bug. Let's solve the issue by denying user
namespaces."  Which leads to half thought out policies made out of fear.

Which is where I think this conversation started.  I haven't seen it
make it's way to any healthy reasons to deny user namespaces yet.

Eric