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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l27-20020a50d6db000000b0043de0917993si8391456edj.216.2022.08.15.16.25.33; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 16:25:58 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.s=korg header.b=tMJKpSEw; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=linuxfoundation.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346465AbiHOXAf (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 15 Aug 2022 19:00:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44472 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1352494AbiHOW6f (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Aug 2022 18:58:35 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2F943DD767; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 12:56:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5072B80EAB; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 19:56:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 28401C433C1; Mon, 15 Aug 2022 19:56:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1660593397; bh=6rswtPHCBmofH9wCL2FhhYPwRwY21gb1uDolVJabZu8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=tMJKpSEwlIK2eaHssS2eSxH0p5tmGbdudZReGqqt8sAn0kC3G6wm9vZOz5h2HbaTi jUuE5f3gSAQaoc+wAmOjKr6256+wFPG68l9A8Iw2bcqXNR8w59+STt0suwn93B8RMQ Rf8EYISYIjX1uTEGeaAX4dr5dIzaifhYG7uNXCl8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Chen Zhongjin , Ingo Molnar , "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.18 0940/1095] kprobes: Forbid probing on trampoline and BPF code areas Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 20:05:39 +0200 Message-Id: <20220815180508.075719763@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 In-Reply-To: <20220815180429.240518113@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220815180429.240518113@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.67 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Chen Zhongjin [ Upstream commit 28f6c37a2910f565b4f5960df52b2eccae28c891 ] kernel_text_address() treats ftrace_trampoline, kprobe_insn_slot and bpf_text_address as valid kprobe addresses - which is not ideal. These text areas are removable and changeable without any notification to kprobes, and probing on them can trigger unexpected behavior: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/7/26/1148 Considering that jump_label and static_call text are already forbiden to probe, kernel_text_address() should be replaced with core_kernel_text() and is_module_text_address() to check other text areas which are unsafe to kprobe. [ mingo: Rewrote the changelog. ] Fixes: 5b485629ba0d ("kprobes, extable: Identify kprobes trampolines as kernel text area") Fixes: 74451e66d516 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces") Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801033719.228248-1-chenzhongjin@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/kprobes.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index f214f8c088ed..80697e5e03e4 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -1560,7 +1560,8 @@ static int check_kprobe_address_safe(struct kprobe *p, preempt_disable(); /* Ensure it is not in reserved area nor out of text */ - if (!kernel_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr) || + if (!(core_kernel_text((unsigned long) p->addr) || + is_module_text_address((unsigned long) p->addr)) || within_kprobe_blacklist((unsigned long) p->addr) || jump_label_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) || static_call_text_reserved(p->addr, p->addr) || -- 2.35.1