Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2007 14:28:19 -0700 (PDT)
From: david@lang.hm
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@novell.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
       Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
       Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
       linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ
In-Reply-To: <20070609210151.GB6663@elf.ucw.cz>
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On Sat, 9 Jun 2007, Pavel Machek wrote:

> Hi!
>
>>>> I'm not sure if AppArmor can be made good security for the general case,
>>>> but it is a model that works in the limited http environment
>>>> (eg .htaccess) and is something people can play with and hack on and may
>>>> be possible to configure to be very secure.
>>>>
>>> Perhaps -- until your httpd is compromised via a buffer overflow or
>>> simply misbehaves due to a software or configuration flaw, then the
>>> assumptions being made about its use of pathnames and their security
>>> properties are out the window.
>>>
>> How is it that you think a buffer overflow in httpd could allow an
>> attacker to break out of an AppArmor profile? This is exactly what
>> AppArmor was designed to do, and without specifics, this is just
>> FUD.
>
> No, it is not, I already broke AppArmor once, and it took me less then
> one hour.
>
> Give me machine with root shell, and make app armor permit everything
> but reading /etc/secret.file. AppArmor is not designed for this, but
> if you want to claim your solution works, this looks like a nice test.
>
> Actually, give password to everyone, and see who breaks it first.

you admit that AA isn't designed for this and then you set this as the 
test, doesn't that seem unreasonable to you?

SELinux may be designed to protect against a local root user, AA is not.

different tools, different tasks.

David Lang
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