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From:   Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc:     hch@infradead.org, m.szyprowski@samsung.com, robin.murphy@arm.com,
        Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH] swiotlb: fix a typo
Date:   Fri, 26 Aug 2022 17:50:46 +0800
Message-Id: <20220826095046.880626-1-chao.gao@intel.com>
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"overwirte" isn't a word. It should be "overwrite".

Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
BTW, I am wondering if copying the original buffer to the tlb buffer
unconditionally will leak the original buffer to the VMM, especially
when VMM isn't trusted e.g., by confidential VMs. Would it be better
to zero the tlb buffer for dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE?

 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index c5a9190b218f..f67e5f50ee3c 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,
 	/*
 	 * When dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE we could omit the copy from the orig
 	 * to the tlb buffer, if we knew for sure the device will
-	 * overwirte the entire current content. But we don't. Thus
+	 * overwrite the entire current content. But we don't. Thus
 	 * unconditional bounce may prevent leaking swiotlb content (i.e.
 	 * kernel memory) to user-space.
 	 */
-- 
2.25.1