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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id u11-20020a65670b000000b0042a39b56e98si10099204pgf.389.2022.08.29.10.35.03; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:35:15 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20210112 header.b=FocFynqO; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231415AbiH2RLL (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 29 Aug 2022 13:11:11 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52518 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231294AbiH2RK7 (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2022 13:10:59 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x104a.google.com (mail-pj1-x104a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::104a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B3E4C63F17 for ; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:10:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x104a.google.com with SMTP id q60-20020a17090a17c200b001fbc6ba91bbso3534720pja.4 for ; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:10:56 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:from:to:cc; bh=6LTZwMRrvDfqpVLhhHWZqp+4pXfvnPC22KdqKnuCz/0=; b=FocFynqOz+suSfkXv90fdFT1W9TWPO5+CnSrEiXMlB57S0wcKJv+jvfvOofZBhm9x4 yCLrY0dFO/JMl8SdBgSGb5NRShYPh7u4NGUVyZCV6z+xdj4Iu90vHNEX1zK9sox2LJ8R 7k9EgEMEG0NJeJbu1Txz/SfpvSybz5ZLIF/Xz+RRrzF2JowSk1+J6bJyFd51csJyA4lk QGEZDHZ2n9ga9yH5EbMoSzPZNyLk5Eztd/481pJk3ZowGknw09ehKoaBWkvew4jNaVtQ dZyjO6oBL5yaPgPgmIq6N7u1jeM1eq9APXSdnvDlp/ersUD2kcYMNf7g1Dn75Xgp7cWk JGPQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=6LTZwMRrvDfqpVLhhHWZqp+4pXfvnPC22KdqKnuCz/0=; b=PU6+ZoEtahw7ks1vG8XO7UzNAl8Fopm6tk1scE6ujGV5HPLBnIYyAGjUASGAX77hMW BxVkNhanowbFcxODMEQiI4idZ2AKu9uaCkuHw0NMs1M7VYYUnh94Kh3nl8WgGmRgoGBN TwU0aF/AeRVM+ikPxkuXzR9kqw9EXjKEd8KTKFGvg8/h0HrYeBLAqVNWXmjcN/dJAH7v bXD0YOp3RMgvw9690VjBfFV2HwJaTii2ixXyhu08rUpkx1MYjn4XH9rFm7QA93sdgo61 g5PTPIVyXzq8RBvYDk0EiCOHTW2ZxPTTyEGIkWFsvCh2hCsLpVZGPUzdAY/S+rG95TC9 +xfw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo2xx1gYhJJ+tNpwJlI9DxCS9Bt2wv75PnfV5Tk0zEeIkVd0TdxD py/pVFa6Vk0AP+sZ42HfgyI/qc2rIpA= X-Received: from pgonda1.kir.corp.google.com ([2620:15c:29:203:cddb:77a7:c55e:a7a2]) (user=pgonda job=sendgmr) by 2002:a63:e507:0:b0:42c:65d3:f3b6 with SMTP id r7-20020a63e507000000b0042c65d3f3b6mr1935660pgh.395.1661793056160; Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:10:56 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 10:10:16 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20220829171021.701198-1-pgonda@google.com> Message-Id: <20220829171021.701198-4-pgonda@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20220829171021.701198-1-pgonda@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2.672.g94769d06f0-goog Subject: [V4 3/8] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory From: Peter Gonda To: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, marcorr@google.com, seanjc@google.com, michael.roth@amd.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, joro@8bytes.org, mizhang@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, andrew.jones@linux.dev, Peter Gonda Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Michael Roth VM implementations that make use of encrypted memory need a way to configure things like the encryption/shared bit position for page table handling, the default encryption policy for internal allocations made by the core library, and a way to fetch the list/bitmap of encrypted pages to do the actual memory encryption. Add an interface to configure these parameters. Also introduce a sparsebit map to track allocations/mappings that should be treated as encrypted, and provide a way for VM implementations to retrieve it to handle operations related memory encryption. Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang Signed-off-by: Michael Roth Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda --- .../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 17 ++++++ tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h index 59d52b58a1a6..5ecde5ad4c2f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ typedef uint64_t vm_vaddr_t; /* Virtual Machine (Guest) virtual address */ struct userspace_mem_region { struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region; struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages; + struct sparsebit *encrypted_phy_pages; int fd; off_t offset; void *host_mem; @@ -65,6 +66,14 @@ struct userspace_mem_regions { DECLARE_HASHTABLE(slot_hash, 9); }; +/* Memory encryption policy/configuration. */ +struct vm_memcrypt { + bool enabled; + int8_t enc_by_default; + bool has_enc_bit; + int8_t enc_bit; +}; + struct kvm_vm { int mode; unsigned long type; @@ -89,6 +98,7 @@ struct kvm_vm { vm_vaddr_t idt; vm_vaddr_t handlers; uint32_t dirty_ring_size; + struct vm_memcrypt memcrypt; /* Cache of information for binary stats interface */ int stats_fd; @@ -849,4 +859,11 @@ static inline int __vm_disable_nx_huge_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm) return __vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_VM_DISABLE_NX_HUGE_PAGES, 0); } +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit); + +const struct sparsebit *vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, + vm_paddr_t *gpa_start, + uint64_t *size); + #endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_UTIL_BASE_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c index 06559994711e..53b9a509c1d5 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c @@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION, ®ion->region); sparsebit_free(®ion->unused_phy_pages); + sparsebit_free(®ion->encrypted_phy_pages); ret = munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size); TEST_ASSERT(!ret, __KVM_SYSCALL_ERROR("munmap()", ret)); @@ -893,6 +894,7 @@ void vm_userspace_mem_region_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, } region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); + region->encrypted_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc(); sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages, guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages); region->region.slot = slot; @@ -1108,6 +1110,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id) * num - number of pages * paddr_min - Physical address minimum * memslot - Memory region to allocate page from + * encrypt - Whether to treat the pages as encrypted * * Output Args: None * @@ -1119,8 +1122,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu *__vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id) * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min. */ -vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, - vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +static vm_paddr_t +_vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, + uint32_t memslot, bool encrypt) { struct userspace_mem_region *region; sparsebit_idx_t pg, base; @@ -1152,12 +1156,22 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, abort(); } - for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) + for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) { sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg); + if (encrypt) + sparsebit_set(region->encrypted_phy_pages, pg); + } return base * vm->page_size; } +vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, + vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) +{ + return _vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot, + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default); +} + vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot) { @@ -1741,6 +1755,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t indent) region->host_mem); fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0); + if (vm->memcrypt.enabled) { + fprintf(stream, "%*sencrypted_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, ""); + sparsebit_dump(stream, region->encrypted_phy_pages, 0); + } } fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, ""); sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2); @@ -1989,3 +2007,31 @@ void __vm_get_stat(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *stat_name, uint64_t *data, break; } } + +void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit, + uint8_t enc_bit) +{ + vm->memcrypt.enabled = true; + vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default = enc_by_default; + vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit = has_enc_bit; + vm->memcrypt.enc_bit = enc_bit; +} + +const struct sparsebit * +vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, vm_paddr_t *gpa_start, + uint64_t *size) +{ + struct userspace_mem_region *region; + + if (!vm->memcrypt.enabled) + return NULL; + + region = memslot2region(vm, slot); + if (!region) + return NULL; + + *size = region->region.memory_size; + *gpa_start = region->region.guest_phys_addr; + + return region->encrypted_phy_pages; +} -- 2.37.2.672.g94769d06f0-goog