Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754889AbXFPJI6 (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Jun 2007 05:08:58 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752649AbXFPJIt (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Jun 2007 05:08:49 -0400 Received: from py-out-1112.google.com ([64.233.166.177]:58537 "EHLO py-out-1112.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752597AbXFPJIr (ORCPT ); Sat, 16 Jun 2007 05:08:47 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=mm56bbq6/SWxKAPyrivu2LF9liPkx8qkE/xI1MWBvZ35PZ9fTu3pDpli3NaXFLVooC2qVZMu4SBH9bOY4fILT9IXGHO667MUzh1MUTPq47YRLooitpGeao/cLA1hV76+dblDUbUahgo9le+2WJlBXGLJ+ZeFys0bPG8WqAqbnXw= Message-ID: <787b0d920706160208u62f8a2c5q5f94f5986d755d24@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2007 05:08:46 -0400 From: "Albert Cahalan" To: "Pavel Machek" Subject: Re: [TOMOYO 5/9] Memory and pathname management functions. Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, takedakn@nttdata.co.jp, hch@infradead.org In-Reply-To: <20070615130000.GI9442@ucw.cz> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline References: <787b0d920706150016n3e941a4fj4fc2e864a7e6f7d7@mail.gmail.com> <20070615130000.GI9442@ucw.cz> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 903 Lines: 24 On 6/15/07, Pavel Machek wrote: > [Albert Cahalan] > > It's really not worth getting bothered by. Truth is, big > > giant > > pathnames break lots of stuff already, both kernel and > > userspace. > > > Just look in /proc for some nice juicy kernel breakage: > > cwd, exe, fd/*, maps, mounts, mountstats, root, smaps > > Well, but we should be fixing that, not adding more. And /proc is > info-only, while this is security related code. Security tools read from /proc, so /proc is security-related. The limit imposed by TOMOYO (or AppArmor) is fine, despite being security-related. It just needs to fail in the safe direction: access denied. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/