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Date:   Wed, 7 Sep 2022 22:08:55 -0700
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To:     "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>,
        bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/kprobes: Fix kprobes instruction boudary
 check with CONFIG_RETHUNK
Message-ID: <20220908050855.w77mimzznrlp6pwe@treble>
References: <166260087224.759381.4170102827490658262.stgit@devnote2>
 <166260088298.759381.11727280480035568118.stgit@devnote2>
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On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 10:34:43AM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu (Google) wrote:
> From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> 
> Since the CONFIG_RETHUNK and CONFIG_SLS will use INT3 for stopping
> speculative execution after RET instruction, kprobes always failes to
> check the probed instruction boundary by decoding the function body if
> the probed address is after such sequence. (Note that some conditional
> code blocks will be placed after function return, if compiler decides
> it is not on the hot path.)
> 
> This is because kprobes expects someone (e.g. kgdb) puts the INT3 as
> a software breakpoint and it will replace the original instruction.
> But these INT3 are not such purpose, it doesn't need to recover the
> original instruction.
> 
> To avoid this issue, memorize the branch target address during decoding
> and if there is INT3, restart decoding from unchecked target address.

Hm, is kprobes conflicting with kgdb actually a realistic concern?
Seems like a dangerous combination

Either way, this feels overengineered.  Sort of like implementing
objtool in the kernel.

And it's incomplete: for a switch statement jump table (or C goto jump
table like in BPF), you can't detect the potential targets of the
indirect branch.

Wouldn't it be much simpler to just encode the knowledge that

  	if (CONFIG_RETHUNK && !X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK)
		// all rets are followed by four INT3s
	else if (CONFIG_SLS)
		// all rets are followed by one INT3

?
	
-- 
Josh