Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20;
Date:   Thu, 8 Sep 2022 09:13:31 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc:     agk@redhat.com, mka@chromium.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
        dianders@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, sarthakkukreti@chromium.org
Subject: Re: dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
Message-ID: <202209080912.00880AD6@keescook>
References: <20220907133055.1.Ic8a1dafe960dc0f8302e189642bc88ebb785d274@changeid>
 <166259004596.4128104.7200162640366282166.b4-ty@chromium.org>
 <YxoJcG5MN4OdaulL@redhat.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <YxoJcG5MN4OdaulL@redhat.com>
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at  6:34P -0400,
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > panic.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > 
> > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> > 
> > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> >       https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
> 
> Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream?  I prefer to
> take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.

Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?

-- 
Kees Cook