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Subject: Re: TPM: hibernate with IMA PCR 10
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc:     Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
        Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Daniil Lunev <dlunev@google.com>,
        "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
        Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>,
        Linux PM <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Date:   Sat, 10 Sep 2022 22:40:05 -0400
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On Thu, 2022-09-08 at 08:25 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07, 2022 at 07:57:27PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2022-09-07 at 13:47 -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 7:48 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Aug 29, 2022 at 02:51:50PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 29, 2022 at 2:45 PM Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 5/4/2022 7:20 PM, Evan Green wrote:
> > > > > > > Enabling the kernel to be able to do encryption and integrity checks on
> > > > > > > the hibernate image prevents a malicious userspace from escalating to
> > > > > > > kernel execution via hibernation resume.  [snip]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I have a related question.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > When a TPM powers up from hibernation, PCR 10 is reset.  When a
> > > > > > hibernate image is restored:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > 1. Is there a design for how PCR 10 is restored?
> > > > >
> > > > > I don't see anything that does that at present.
> > > > >
> > > > > > 2. How are /sys/kernel/security/ima/[pseudofiles] saved and
> > > > > > restored?
> > > > >
> > > > > They're part of the running kernel state, so should re-appear without
> > > > > any special casing. However, in the absence of anything repopulating
> > > > > PCR 10, they'll no longer match the in-TPM value.
> > > >
> > > > This feature could still be supported, if IMA is disabled
> > > > in the kernel configuration, which I see a non-issue as
> > > > long as config flag checks are there.
> > > 
> > > Right, from what I understand about IMA, the TPM's PCR getting out of
> > > sync with the in-kernel measurement list across a hibernate (because
> > > TPM is reset) or kexec() (because in-memory list gets reset) is
> > > already a problem. This series doesn't really address that, in that it
> > > doesn't really make that situation better or worse.
> > 
> > For kexec, the PCRs are not reset, so the IMA measurment list needs to
> > be carried across kexec and restored.  This is now being done on most
> > architectures.  Afterwards, the IMA measurement list does match the
> > PCRs.
> > 
> > Hibernation introduces a different situation, where the the PCRs are
> > reset, but the measurement list is restored, resulting in their not
> > matching.
> 
> As I said earlier the feature still can be supported if
> kernel does not use IMA but obviously needs to be flagged.

Jumping to the conclusion that "hibernate" is acceptable for non-IMA
enabled kernels misses the security implications of mixing (kexec) non-
IMA and IMA enabled kernels. 
I would prefer some sort of hibernate marker, the equivalent of a
"boot_aggregate" record.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi