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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org,
        Nagaraj Arankal <nagaraj.p.arankal@hpe.com>,
        Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 093/121] tcp: fix early ETIMEDOUT after spurious non-SACK RTO
Date:   Tue, 13 Sep 2022 16:04:44 +0200
Message-Id: <20220913140401.356858232@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20220913140357.323297659@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 686dc2db2a0fdc1d34b424ec2c0a735becd8d62b ]

Fix a bug reported and analyzed by Nagaraj Arankal, where the handling
of a spurious non-SACK RTO could cause a connection to fail to clear
retrans_stamp, causing a later RTO to very prematurely time out the
connection with ETIMEDOUT.

Here is the buggy scenario, expanding upon Nagaraj Arankal's excellent
report:

(*1) Send one data packet on a non-SACK connection

(*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted
     and we enter CA_Loss; but this retransmission is spurious.

(*3) The ACK for the original data is received. The transmitted packet
     is acknowledged.  The TCP timestamp is before the retrans_stamp,
     so tcp_may_undo() returns true, and tcp_try_undo_loss() returns
     true without changing state to Open (because tcp_is_sack() is
     false), and tcp_process_loss() returns without calling
     tcp_try_undo_recovery().  Normally after undoing a CA_Loss
     episode, tcp_fastretrans_alert() would see that the connection
     has returned to CA_Open and fall through and call
     tcp_try_to_open(), which would set retrans_stamp to 0.  However,
     for non-SACK connections we hold the connection in CA_Loss, so do
     not fall through to call tcp_try_to_open() and do not set
     retrans_stamp to 0. So retrans_stamp is (erroneously) still
     non-zero.

     At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and
     been recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely
     new "event". However, retrans_stamp is erroneously still
     set. (And we are still in CA_Loss, which is correct.)

(*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with tcp_retries2=15), a new data
     packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and
     (*4) and we disabled keep alives.

     The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in
     time, but instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16
     minutes ago (step (*2)).

(*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.

(*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns
     ETIMEDOUT, prematurely, because retrans_stamp is (erroneously)
     too far in the past (set at the time of (*2)).

This commit fixes this bug by ensuring that we reuse in
tcp_try_undo_loss() the same careful logic for non-SACK connections
that we have in tcp_try_undo_recovery(). To avoid duplicating logic,
we factor out that logic into a new
tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen() helper and call that helper from
both undo functions.

Fixes: da34ac7626b5 ("tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss")
Reported-by: Nagaraj Arankal <nagaraj.p.arankal@hpe.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ0PR84MB1847BE6C24D274C46A1B9B0EB27A9@SJ0PR84MB1847.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM/
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220903121023.866900-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 7fd7e7cba0c92..686e210d89c21 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -2506,6 +2506,21 @@ static inline bool tcp_may_undo(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
 	return tp->undo_marker && (!tp->undo_retrans || tcp_packet_delayed(tp));
 }
 
+static bool tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+
+	if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
+		/* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
+		 * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
+		 * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
+		if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
+			tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* People celebrate: "We love our President!" */
 static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
 {
@@ -2528,14 +2543,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
 	} else if (tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist) {
 		tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist--;
 	}
-	if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
-		/* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
-		 * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
-		 * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
-		if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
-			tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
+	if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
 		return true;
-	}
 	tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
 	tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
 	return false;
@@ -2571,6 +2580,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_loss(struct sock *sk, bool frto_undo)
 			NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
 					LINUX_MIB_TCPSPURIOUSRTOS);
 		inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits = 0;
+		if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
+			return true;
 		if (frto_undo || tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
 			tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
 			tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
-- 
2.35.1