Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758401AbXFTSZb (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:25:31 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753722AbXFTSZX (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:25:23 -0400 Received: from nz-out-0506.google.com ([64.233.162.232]:26436 "EHLO nz-out-0506.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753547AbXFTSZW (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:25:22 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=beta; h=received:message-id:date:from:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references; b=Y7hDbRP6Yv9lWsGMLuEGZGmXkBXRz+ekmDWue9JnjRqmFSUOORwU/HaS4h842GjSXP9jveI3IqRwA5cN/qCbNcuewWIVIu6XOCMpGP5TzUqXr8MBX9RSnqP5hIKaCdBRhvWlVWKd3gExC3m5V2AiL2QzGpsgvqOL25W+hU4kl9E= Message-ID: <787b0d920706201125g2368a4e1i2d115b0b2d5399e5@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 14:25:20 -0400 From: "Albert Cahalan" To: "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: Re: JIT emulator needs Cc: "William Lee Irwin III" , linux-kernel In-Reply-To: <467957CB.8020704@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline References: <787b0d920706072335v10d6025cwe1437194b6c60d84@mail.gmail.com> <20070619150824.GH11781@holomorphy.com> <787b0d920706192016l660dd5b0mbf300581db81ac62@mail.gmail.com> <20070620160116.GI6909@holomorphy.com> <467957CB.8020704@zytor.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1597 Lines: 35 On 6/20/07, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > William Lee Irwin III wrote: > > I presumed an ELF note or extended filesystem attributes were already > > in place for this sort of affair. It may be that the model implemented > > is so restrictive that users are forbidden to create new executables, > > in which case using a different model is certainly in order. Otherwise > > the ELF note or attributes need to be implemented. > > Another thing to keep in mind, since we're talking about security > policies in the first place, is that anything like this *MUST* be > "opt-in" on the part of the security policy, because what we're talking > about is circumventing an explicit security policy just based on a > user-provided binary saying, in effect, "don't worry, I know what I'm > doing." > > Changing the meaning of an established explicit security policy is not > acceptable. Not in this case. If an attacker can CHANGE THE BINARY then it's already game over. Putting this into the security policy was an error born of lazyness to begin with. Abuse of the security mechanism was easier than hacking the toolchain, ELF loader, etc. Either a binary needs self-modification, or it doesn't. This is determined by the author of the code. If you don't trust an executable that needs this ability, then you simply can not run it in a useful way. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/