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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id o8-20020a656148000000b0041b67131e27si841570pgv.309.2022.09.20.01.15.12; Tue, 20 Sep 2022 01:15:24 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230220AbiITIBZ (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 20 Sep 2022 04:01:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58200 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230190AbiITIAs (ORCPT ); Tue, 20 Sep 2022 04:00:48 -0400 Received: from frasgout13.his.huawei.com (frasgout13.his.huawei.com [14.137.139.46]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1E31E62A89; Tue, 20 Sep 2022 01:00:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail02.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.228]) by frasgout13.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4MWv312TDlz9xtmt; Tue, 20 Sep 2022 15:54:53 +0800 (CST) Received: from huaweicloud.com (unknown [10.204.63.22]) by APP2 (Coremail) with SMTP id GxC2BwAno13_ciljaChgAA--.64537S2; Tue, 20 Sep 2022 09:00:11 +0100 (CET) From: Roberto Sassu To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, mykolal@fb.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, mingo@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, shuah@kernel.org Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, deso@posteo.net, memxor@gmail.com, Roberto Sassu Subject: [PATCH v18 00/13] bpf: Add kfuncs for PKCS#7 signature verification Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 09:59:38 +0200 Message-Id: <20220920075951.929132-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CM-TRANSID: GxC2BwAno13_ciljaChgAA--.64537S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1UD129KBjvAXoW3uFyxtFy3uryUKFW5Gw1xZrb_yoW8Wr4UZo WfWw4fWay5Kr17ArnrCF1xCFy8uw1Ik34DArsIvr15WFnFgrWUCFyDua1xXr4qgan5WFyj ga45C34DZFZrX3Zxn29KB7ZKAUJUUUUU529EdanIXcx71UUUUU7v73VFW2AGmfu7bjvjm3 AaLaJ3UjIYCTnIWjp_UUUY17kC6x804xWl14x267AKxVWrJVCq3wAFc2x0x2IEx4CE42xK 8VAvwI8IcIk0rVWrJVCq3wAFIxvE14AKwVWUJVWUGwA2ocxC64kIII0Yj41l84x0c7CEw4 AK67xGY2AK021l84ACjcxK6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xM28EF7xvwVC0I7IYx2IY6xkF 7I0E14v26r4j6F4UM28EF7xvwVC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1l84ACjcxK6I8E87Iv6xkF7I 0E14v26r4j6r4UJwAS0I0E0xvYzxvE52x082IY62kv0487Mc02F40EFcxC0VAKzVAqx4xG 6I80ewAv7VC0I7IYx2IY67AKxVWUGVWUXwAv7VC2z280aVAFwI0_Jr0_Gr1lOx8S6xCaFV Cjc4AY6r1j6r4UM4x0Y48IcxkI7VAKI48JM4IIrI8v6xkF7I0E8cxan2IY04v7MxAIw28I cxkI7VAKI48JMxC20s026xCaFVCjc4AY6r1j6r4UMI8I3I0E5I8CrVAFwI0_Jr0_Jr4lx2 IqxVCjr7xvwVAFwI0_JrI_JrWlx4CE17CEb7AF67AKxVW8ZVWrXwCIc40Y0x0EwIxGrwCI 42IY6xIIjxv20xvE14v26r1j6r1xMIIF0xvE2Ix0cI8IcVCY1x0267AKxVW8JVWxJwCI42 IY6xAIw20EY4v20xvaj40_WFyUJVCq3wCI42IY6I8E87Iv67AKxVWUJVW8JwCI42IY6I8E 87Iv6xkF7I0E14v26r4j6r4UJbIYCTnIWIevJa73UjIFyTuYvjxUOlksDUUUU X-CM-SenderInfo: purev21wro2thvvxqx5xdzvxpfor3voofrz/1tbiAQABBF1jj4M-rgACsl X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Roberto Sassu One of the desirable features in security is the ability to restrict import of data to a given system based on data authenticity. If data import can be restricted, it would be possible to enforce a system-wide policy based on the signing keys the system owner trusts. This feature is widely used in the kernel. For example, if the restriction is enabled, kernel modules can be plugged in only if they are signed with a key whose public part is in the primary or secondary keyring. For eBPF, it can be useful as well. For example, it might be useful to authenticate data an eBPF program makes security decisions on. After a discussion in the eBPF mailing list, it was decided that the stated goal should be accomplished by introducing four new kfuncs: bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_lookup_system_key(), for retrieving a keyring with keys trusted for signature verification, respectively from its serial and from a pre-determined ID; bpf_key_put(), to release the reference obtained with the former two kfuncs, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(), for verifying PKCS#7 signatures. Other than the key serial, bpf_lookup_user_key() also accepts key lookup flags, that influence the behavior of the lookup. bpf_lookup_system_key() accepts pre-determined IDs defined in include/linux/verification.h. bpf_key_put() accepts the new bpf_key structure, introduced to tell whether the other structure member, a key pointer, is valid or not. The reason is that verify_pkcs7_signature() also accepts invalid pointers, set with the pre-determined ID, to select a system-defined keyring. key_put() must be called only for valid key pointers. Since the two key lookup functions allocate memory and one increments a key reference count, they must be used in conjunction with bpf_key_put(). The latter must be called only if the lookup functions returned a non-NULL pointer. The verifier denies the execution of eBPF programs that don't respect this rule. The two key lookup functions should be used in alternative, depending on the use case. While bpf_lookup_user_key() provides great flexibility, it seems suboptimal in terms of security guarantees, as even if the eBPF program is assumed to be trusted, the serial used to obtain the key pointer might come from untrusted user space not choosing one that the system administrator approves to enforce a mandatory policy. bpf_lookup_system_key() instead provides much stronger guarantees, especially if the pre-determined ID is not passed by user space but is hardcoded in the eBPF program, and that program is signed. In this case, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() will always perform signature verification with a key that the system administrator approves, i.e. the primary, secondary or platform keyring. Nevertheless, key permission checks need to be done accurately. Since bpf_lookup_user_key() cannot determine how a key will be used by other kfuncs, it has to defer the permission check to the actual kfunc using the key. It does it by calling lookup_user_key() with KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK as needed permission. Later, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(), if called, completes the permission check by calling key_validate(). It does not need to call key_task_permission() with permission KEY_NEED_SEARCH, as it is already done elsewhere by the key subsystem. Future kfuncs using the bpf_key structure need to implement the proper checks as well. Finally, the last kfunc, bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(), accepts the data and signature to verify as eBPF dynamic pointers, to minimize the number of kfunc parameters, and the keyring with keys for signature verification as a bpf_key structure, returned by one of the two key lookup functions. bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() can be called only from sleepable programs, because of memory allocation and crypto operations. For example, the lsm.s/bpf attach point is suitable, fexit/array_map_update_elem is not. The correctness of implementation of the new kfuncs and of their usage is checked with the introduced tests. The patch set includes a patch from another author (dependency) for sake of completeness. It is organized as follows. Patch 1 from KP Singh allows kfuncs to be used by LSM programs. Patch 2 exports the bpf_dynptr definition through BTF. Patch 3 splits is_dynptr_reg_valid_init() and introduces is_dynptr_type_expected(), to know more precisely the cause of a negative result of a dynamic pointer check. Patch 4 allows dynamic pointers to be used as kfunc parameters. Patch 5 exports bpf_dynptr_get_size(), to obtain the real size of data carried by a dynamic pointer. Patch 6 makes available for new eBPF kfuncs and programs some key-related definitions. Patch 7 introduces the bpf_lookup_*_key() and bpf_key_put() kfuncs. Patch 8 introduces the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc. Patch 9 changes the testing kernel configuration to compile everything as built-in. Finally, patches 10-13 introduce the tests. Changelog v17: - Remove unnecessary typedefs in test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c (suggested by KP) - Add patch to export bpf_dynptr through BTF (reported by KP) - Rename u{8,16,32,64} variables to __u{8,16,32,64} in the tests, for consistency with other eBPF programs (suggested by Yonghong) v16: - Remove comments in include/linux/key.h for KEY_LOOKUP_* - Change kmalloc() flag from GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL in bpf_lookup_user_key(), as the kfunc needs anyway to be sleepable (suggested by Kumar) - Test passing a dynamic pointer with NULL data to bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() (suggested by Kumar) v15: - Add kfunc_dynptr_param test to deny list for s390x v14: - Explain that is_dynptr_type_expected() will be useful also for BTF (suggested by Joanne) - Rename KEY_LOOKUP_FLAGS_ALL to KEY_LOOKUP_ALL (suggested by Jarkko) - Swap declaration of spi and dynptr_type in is_dynptr_type_expected() (suggested by Joanne) - Reimplement kfunc dynptr tests with a regular eBPF program instead of executing them with test_verifier (suggested by Joanne) - Make key lookup flags as enum so that they are automatically exported through BTF (suggested by Alexei) v13: - Split is_dynptr_reg_valid_init() and introduce is_dynptr_type_expected() to see if the dynamic pointer type passed as argument to a kfunc is supported (suggested by Kumar) - Add forward declaration of struct key in include/linux/bpf.h (suggested by Song) - Declare mask for key lookup flags, remove key_lookup_flags_check() (suggested by Jarkko and KP) - Allow only certain dynamic pointer types (currently, local) to be passed as argument to kfuncs (suggested by Kumar) - For each dynamic pointer parameter in kfunc, additionally check if the passed pointer is to the stack (suggested by Kumar) - Split the validity/initialization and dynamic pointer type check also in the verifier, and adjust the expected error message in the test (a test for an unexpected dynptr type passed to a helper cannot be added due to missing suitable helpers, but this case has been tested manually) - Add verifier tests to check the dynamic pointers passed as argument to kfuncs (suggested by Kumar) v12: - Put lookup_key and verify_pkcs7_sig tests in deny list for s390x (JIT does not support calling kernel function) v11: - Move stringify_struct() macro to include/linux/btf.h (suggested by Daniel) - Change kernel configuration options in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config* from =m to =y v10: - Introduce key_lookup_flags_check() and system_keyring_id_check() inline functions to check parameters (suggested by KP) - Fix descriptions and comment of key-related kfuncs (suggested by KP) - Register kfunc set only once (suggested by Alexei) - Move needed kernel options to the architecture-independent configuration for testing v9: - Drop patch to introduce KF_SLEEPABLE kfunc flag (already merged) - Rename valid_ptr member of bpf_key to has_ref (suggested by Daniel) - Check dynamic pointers in kfunc definition with bpf_dynptr_kern struct definition instead of string, to detect structure renames (suggested by Daniel) - Explicitly say that we permit initialized dynamic pointers in kfunc definition (suggested by Daniel) - Remove noinline __weak from kfuncs definition (reported by Daniel) - Simplify key lookup flags check in bpf_lookup_user_key() (suggested by Daniel) - Explain the reason for deferring key permission check (suggested by Daniel) - Allocate memory with GFP_ATOMIC in bpf_lookup_system_key(), and remove KF_SLEEPABLE kfunc flag from kfunc declaration (suggested by Daniel) - Define only one kfunc set and remove the loop for registration (suggested by Alexei) v8: - Define the new bpf_key structure to carry the key pointer and whether that pointer is valid or not (suggested by Daniel) - Drop patch to mark a kfunc parameter with the __maybe_null suffix - Improve documentation of kfuncs - Introduce bpf_lookup_system_key() to obtain a key pointer suitable for verify_pkcs7_signature() (suggested by Daniel) - Use the new kfunc registration API - Drop patch to test the __maybe_null suffix - Add tests for bpf_lookup_system_key() v7: - Add support for using dynamic and NULL pointers in kfunc (suggested by Alexei) - Add new kfunc-related tests v6: - Switch back to key lookup helpers + signature verification (until v5), and defer permission check from bpf_lookup_user_key() to bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() - Add additional key lookup test to illustrate the usage of the KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE flag and validate the flags (suggested by Daniel) - Make description of flags of bpf_lookup_user_key() more user-friendly (suggested by Daniel) - Fix validation of flags parameter in bpf_lookup_user_key() (reported by Daniel) - Rename bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() keyring-related parameters to user_keyring and system_keyring to make their purpose more clear - Accept keyring-related parameters of bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() as alternatives (suggested by KP) - Replace unsigned long type with u64 in helper declaration (suggested by Daniel) - Extend the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() test by calling the helper without data, by ensuring that the helper enforces the keyring-related parameters as alternatives, by ensuring that the helper rejects inaccessible and expired keyrings, and by checking all system keyrings - Move bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_key_put() usage tests to ref_tracking.c (suggested by John) - Call bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_key_put() only in sleepable programs v5: - Move KEY_LOOKUP_ to include/linux/key.h for validation of bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() parameter - Remove bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_key_put() helpers, and the corresponding tests - Replace struct key parameter of bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() with the keyring serial and lookup flags - Call lookup_user_key() and key_put() in bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() code, to ensure that the retrieved key is used according to the permission requested at lookup time - Clarified keyring precedence in the description of bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() (suggested by John) - Remove newline in the second argument of ASSERT_ - Fix helper prototype regular expression in bpf_doc.py v4: - Remove bpf_request_key_by_id(), don't return an invalid pointer that other helpers can use - Pass the keyring ID (without ULONG_MAX, suggested by Alexei) to bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() - Introduce bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_key_put() helpers (suggested by Alexei) - Add lookup_key_norelease test, to ensure that the verifier blocks eBPF programs which don't decrement the key reference count - Parse raw PKCS#7 signature instead of module-style signature in the verify_pkcs7_signature test (suggested by Alexei) - Parse kernel module in user space and pass raw PKCS#7 signature to the eBPF program for signature verification v3: - Rename bpf_verify_signature() back to bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() to avoid managing different parameters for each signature verification function in one helper (suggested by Daniel) - Use dynamic pointers and export bpf_dynptr_get_size() (suggested by Alexei) - Introduce bpf_request_key_by_id() to give more flexibility to the caller of bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() to retrieve the appropriate keyring (suggested by Alexei) - Fix test by reordering the gcc command line, always compile sign-file - Improve helper support check mechanism in the test v2: - Rename bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() to a more generic bpf_verify_signature() and pass the signature type (suggested by KP) - Move the helper and prototype declaration under #ifdef so that user space can probe for support for the helper (suggested by Daniel) - Describe better the keyring types (suggested by Daniel) - Include linux/bpf.h instead of vmlinux.h to avoid implicit or redeclaration - Make the test selfcontained (suggested by Alexei) v1: - Don't define new map flag but introduce simple wrapper of verify_pkcs7_signature() (suggested by Alexei and KP) KP Singh (1): bpf: Allow kfuncs to be used in LSM programs Roberto Sassu (12): btf: Export bpf_dynptr definition bpf: Move dynptr type check to is_dynptr_type_expected() btf: Allow dynamic pointer parameters in kfuncs bpf: Export bpf_dynptr_get_size() KEYS: Move KEY_LOOKUP_ to include/linux/key.h and define KEY_LOOKUP_ALL bpf: Add bpf_lookup_*_key() and bpf_key_put() kfuncs bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc selftests/bpf: Compile kernel with everything as built-in selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf_lookup_*_key() and bpf_key_put() selftests/bpf: Add additional tests for bpf_lookup_*_key() selftests/bpf: Add test for bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc selftests/bpf: Add tests for dynamic pointers parameters in kfuncs include/linux/bpf.h | 9 + include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 5 + include/linux/btf.h | 9 + include/linux/key.h | 6 + include/linux/verification.h | 8 + kernel/bpf/btf.c | 34 ++ kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 4 +- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 35 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 180 ++++++++ security/keys/internal.h | 2 - tools/testing/selftests/bpf/DENYLIST.s390x | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 14 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config | 32 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config.x86_64 | 7 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/dynptr.c | 2 +- .../bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 164 +++++++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lookup_key.c | 112 +++++ .../bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 399 ++++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 94 +++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c | 46 ++ .../bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c | 90 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 3 +- .../selftests/bpf/verifier/ref_tracking.c | 139 ++++++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh | 104 +++++ 24 files changed, 1466 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_dynptr_param.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lookup_key.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verify_pkcs7_sig.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verify_sig_setup.sh -- 2.25.1