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Date:   Tue, 20 Sep 2022 10:46:48 +0200
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To:     Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gwendal@chromium.org,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>, jarkko@kernel.org,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        apronin@chromium.org, dlunev@google.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net,
        linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Hao Wu <hao.wu@rubrik.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, axelj <axelj@axis.com>,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation
Message-ID: <20220920084648.GA17087@duo.ucw.cz>
References: <20220823222526.1524851-1-evgreen@chromium.org>
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Hi!

> We are exploring enabling hibernation in some new scenarios. However,
> our security team has a few requirements, listed below:
> 1. The hibernate image must be encrypted with protection derived from
>    both the platform (eg TPM) and user authentication data (eg
>    password).
> 2. Hibernation must not be a vector by which a malicious userspace can
>    escalate to the kernel.

Why is #2 reasonable requirement?

We normally allow userspace with appropriate permissions to update the
kernel, for example.

Best regards,
								Pavel
--=20
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.

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