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From:   Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
To:     linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     jmorris@namei.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, paul@paul-moore.com,
        serge@hallyn.com, ajd@linux.ibm.com, gcwilson@linux.ibm.com,
        nayna@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] powerpc/pseries: restrict error injection and DT changes when locked down
Date:   Thu, 22 Sep 2022 14:38:15 -0500
Message-Id: <20220922193817.106041-1-nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
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Add two new lockdown reasons for use in powerpc's pseries platform
code.

The pseries platform allows hardware-level error injection via certain
calls to the RTAS (Run Time Abstraction Services) firmware. ACPI-based
error injection is already restricted in lockdown; this facility
should be restricted for the same reasons.

pseries also allows nearly arbitrary device tree changes via
/proc/powerpc/ofdt. Just as overriding ACPI tables is not allowed
while locked down, so should this facility be restricted.

Nathan Lynch (2):
  powerpc/pseries: block untrusted device tree changes when locked down
  powerpc/rtas: block error injection when locked down

 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c                | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/reconfig.c |  5 +++++
 include/linux/security.h                  |  2 ++
 security/security.c                       |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

-- 
2.37.3