Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757738AbXFURXc (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Jun 2007 13:23:32 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754381AbXFURX0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Jun 2007 13:23:26 -0400 Received: from mailout.stusta.mhn.de ([141.84.69.5]:35573 "EHLO mailhub.stusta.mhn.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753782AbXFURXZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Jun 2007 13:23:25 -0400 Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 19:23:44 +0200 From: Adrian Bunk To: Alexander Wuerstlein Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] signed binaries support [0/4] Message-ID: <20070621172344.GQ12950@stusta.de> References: <20070621155516.GA6838@faui01.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> <20070621161758.GP12950@stusta.de> <20070621162917.GB9741@cip.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20070621162917.GB9741@cip.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.15+20070412 (2007-04-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1851 Lines: 50 On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 06:29:17PM +0200, Alexander Wuerstlein wrote: > On 070621 18:19, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 05:55:16PM +0200, Johannes Schlumberger wrote: > > > > > Hi, > > > > Hi Johannes, > > > > > We (two students of CS) built a system for signing binaries and verifying them > > > before executing. Our main focus was to implement a way to inhibit execution > > > of suid-binaries, which are not trustworthy (i.e. not signed). > > >... > > > > doesn't anyone who is able to install a not trustworthy suid-binary > > already have the priviliges to do anything he wants to without requiring > > an suid bit? > > Yes, quite correct in most cases. But if you have taken control of a computer > on of the more common ways to keep the control for some time is the > installation of a suid-binary (e.g. as part of a rootkit). There are so many ways for manipulating a computer that controlling setuid binaries hardly brings a real security gain. > One could also imagine a scenario where an attacker controls some filesystems > (on external storage perhaps) where he can of course manipulate the suid bit, > but he does not have direct control over the attacked system unless he can > execute that file. And unless the filesystem is mounted without nosuid... > Ciao, > > Alexander Wuerstlein. cu Adrian -- "Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days. "Only a promise," Lao Er said. Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/