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From:   Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 26 Sep 2022 16:51:44 +0100
Message-ID: <CA+EHjTz5yGhsxUug+wqa9hrBO60Be0dzWeWzX00YtNxin2eYHg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memfd: Introduce userspace inaccessible memfd
To:     Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
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        Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, mhocko@suse.com,
        Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>, wei.w.wang@intel.com,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Precedence: bulk

Hi,

On Mon, Sep 26, 2022 at 3:28 PM Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 04:19:46PM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > > Regarding pKVM's use case, with the shim approach I believe this can be done by
> > > allowing userspace mmap() the "hidden" memfd, but with a ton of restrictions
> > > piled on top.
> > >
> > > My first thought was to make the uAPI a set of KVM ioctls so that KVM could tightly
> > > tightly control usage without taking on too much complexity in the kernel, but
> > > working through things, routing the behavior through the shim itself might not be
> > > all that horrific.
> > >
> > > IIRC, we discarded the idea of allowing userspace to map the "private" fd because
> > > things got too complex, but with the shim it doesn't seem _that_ bad.
> > >
> > > E.g. on the memfd side:
> > >
> > >   1. The entire memfd must be mapped, and at most one mapping is allowed, i.e.
> > >      mapping is all or nothing.
> > >
> > >   2. Acquiring a reference via get_pfn() is disallowed if there's a mapping for
> > >      the restricted memfd.
> > >
> > >   3. Add notifier hooks to allow downstream users to further restrict things.
> > >
> > >   4. Disallow splitting VMAs, e.g. to force userspace to munmap() everything in
> > >      one shot.
> > >
> > >   5. Require that there are no outstanding references at munmap().  Or if this
> > >      can't be guaranteed by userspace, maybe add some way for userspace to wait
> > >      until it's ok to convert to private?  E.g. so that get_pfn() doesn't need
> > >      to do an expensive check every time.
> > >
> > >   static int memfd_restricted_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > >   {
> > >         if (vma->vm_pgoff)
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >         if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) != <file size>)
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >         mutex_lock(&data->lock);
> > >
> > >         if (data->has_mapping) {
> > >                 r = -EINVAL;
> > >                 goto err;
> > >         }
> > >         list_for_each_entry(notifier, &data->notifiers, list) {
> > >                 r = notifier->ops->mmap_start(notifier, ...);
> > >                 if (r)
> > >                         goto abort;
> > >         }
> > >
> > >         notifier->ops->mmap_end(notifier, ...);
> > >         mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
> > >         return 0;
> > >
> > >   abort:
> > >         list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(notifier &data->notifiers, list)
> > >                 notifier->ops->mmap_abort(notifier, ...);
> > >   err:
> > >         mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
> > >         return r;
> > >   }
> > >
> > >   static void memfd_restricted_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > >   {
> > >         mutex_lock(...);
> > >
> > >         /*
> > >          * Destroy the memfd and disable all future accesses if there are
> > >          * outstanding refcounts (or other unsatisfied restrictions?).
> > >          */
> > >         if (<outstanding references> || ???)
> > >                 memfd_restricted_destroy(...);
> > >         else
> > >                 data->has_mapping = false;
> > >
> > >         mutex_unlock(...);
> > >   }
> > >
> > >   static int memfd_restricted_may_split(struct vm_area_struct *area, unsigned long addr)
> > >   {
> > >         return -EINVAL;
> > >   }
> > >
> > >   static int memfd_restricted_mapping_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *new_vma)
> > >   {
> > >         return -EINVAL;
> > >   }
> > >
> > > Then on the KVM side, its mmap_start() + mmap_end() sequence would:
> > >
> > >   1. Not be supported for TDX or SEV-SNP because they don't allow adding non-zero
> > >      memory into the guest (after pre-boot phase).
> > >
> > >   2. Be mutually exclusive with shared<=>private conversions, and is allowed if
> > >      and only if the entire gfn range of the associated memslot is shared.
> >
> > In general I think that this would work with pKVM. However, limiting
> > private<->shared conversions to the granularity of a whole memslot
> > might be difficult to handle in pKVM, since the guest doesn't have the
> > concept of memslots. For example, in pKVM right now, when a guest
> > shares back its restricted DMA pool with the host it does so at the
> > page-level. pKVM would also need a way to make an fd accessible again
> > when shared back, which I think isn't possible with this patch.
>
> But does pKVM really want to mmap/munmap a new region at the page-level,
> that can cause VMA fragmentation if the conversion is frequent as I see.
> Even with a KVM ioctl for mapping as mentioned below, I think there will
> be the same issue.

pKVM doesn't really need to unmap the memory. What is really important
is that the memory is not GUP'able. Having private memory mapped and
then accessed by a misbehaving/malicious process will reinject a fault
into the misbehaving process.

Cheers,
/fuad

> >
> > You were initially considering a KVM ioctl for mapping, which might be
> > better suited for this since KVM knows which pages are shared and
> > which ones are private. So routing things through KVM might simplify
> > things and allow it to enforce all the necessary restrictions (e.g.,
> > private memory cannot be mapped). What do you think?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > /fuad