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From:   Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
To:     <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        <wanpengli@tencent.com>, <jmattson@google.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>,
        <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
        <bilbao@vt.edu>
CC:     Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Fix a few small typos
Date:   Wed, 28 Sep 2022 17:31:42 +0000
Message-ID: <20220928173142.2935674-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
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Fix some typos in file arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c.

Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index f7fe0008bfd1..107fa0f442b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	 */
 	memcpy(save, &svm->vmcb->save, sizeof(svm->vmcb->save));
 
-	/* Sync registgers */
+	/* Sync registers */
 	save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
 	save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
 	save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
@@ -2585,7 +2585,7 @@ void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	/*
 	 * If its an SNP guest, then VMSA was added in the RMP entry as
-	 * a guest owned page. Transition the page to hyperivosr state
+	 * a guest owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state
 	 * before releasing it back to the system.
 	 */
 	if (sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
@@ -3150,7 +3150,7 @@ static int __snp_handle_page_state_change(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum psc_op op,
 				return PSC_UNDEF_ERR;
 
 			/*
-			 * Mark the userspace range unmerable before adding the pages
+			 * Mark the userspace range unmergable before adding the pages
 			 * in the RMP table.
 			 */
 			mmap_write_lock(kvm->mm);
@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ bool sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	ret = __sev_snp_update_protected_guest_state(vcpu);
 	if (ret)
-		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "snp: AP state update on init failed\n");
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "SNP: AP state update on init failed\n");
 
 unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&svm->snp_vmsa_mutex);
@@ -4170,7 +4170,7 @@ void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu)
 	/* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
 	hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
 
-	/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
+	/* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
 	hostsa->xss = host_xss;
 }
 
@@ -4223,7 +4223,7 @@ struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
 	 * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation  #PF if a
 	 * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA
-	 * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the
+	 * or AVIC backing page. The recommended workaround is to not use the
 	 * hugepage.
 	 *
 	 * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned
-- 
2.34.1