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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
        Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@canonical.com>,
        "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>,
        Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
        Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
Date:   Thu,  6 Oct 2022 01:27:35 -0700
Message-Id: <20221006082735.1321612-3-keescook@chromium.org>
In-Reply-To: <20221006082735.1321612-1-keescook@chromium.org>
References: <20221006082735.1321612-1-keescook@chromium.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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With fs_struct explicitly unshared during exec, it is no longer possible
to have unexpected shared state, and LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE can be entirely
removed.

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/exec.c                  | 17 +----------------
 include/linux/security.h   |  5 ++---
 security/apparmor/domain.c |  5 -----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 10 ----------
 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7d5f63f03c58..3cd058711098 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1563,8 +1563,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
  */
 static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
-	unsigned n_fs;
+	struct task_struct *p = current;
 
 	if (p->ptrace)
 		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE;
@@ -1575,20 +1574,6 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 */
 	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
 		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
-
-	t = p;
-	n_fs = 1;
-	spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	while_each_thread(p, t) {
-		if (t->fs == p->fs)
-			n_fs++;
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	if (p->fs->users > n_fs)
-		bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
-	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
 }
 
 static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1bc362cb413f..db508a8c3cc7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -215,9 +215,8 @@ struct sched_param;
 struct request_sock;
 
 /* bprm->unsafe reasons */
-#define LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE	1
-#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE	2
-#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS	4
+#define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE	BIT(0)
+#define LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS	BIT(1)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 91689d34d281..1b2c0bb4d9ae 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -924,11 +924,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		goto audit;
 	}
 
-	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
-		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
-		;
-	}
-
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
 		/* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
 		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79573504783b..3ec80cc8ad1c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2349,16 +2349,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
-		/* Check for shared state */
-		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-					  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
-					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
-					  NULL);
-			if (rc)
-				return -EPERM;
-		}
-
 		/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
 		 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
-- 
2.34.1