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From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 6 Oct 2022 16:13:37 +0200
Message-ID: <CAG48ez0sEkmaez9tYqgMXrkREmXZgxC9fdQD3mzF9cGo_=Tfyg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec
To:     Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@canonical.com>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
        Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
        Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>,
        Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
        Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
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On Thu, Oct 6, 2022 at 11:05 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 06, 2022 at 01:27:34AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > The check_unsafe_exec() counting of n_fs would not add up under a heavily
> > threaded process trying to perform a suid exec, causing the suid portion
> > to fail. This counting error appears to be unneeded, but to catch any
> > possible conditions, explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec, if it ends up
>
> Isn't this a potential uapi break? Afaict, before this change a call to
> clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec in the child would have the
> parent and child share fs information. So if the child e.g., changes the
> working directory post exec it would also affect the parent. But after
> this change here this would no longer be true. So a child changing a
> workding directoro would not affect the parent anymore. IOW, an exec is
> accompanied by an unshare(CLONE_FS). Might still be worth trying ofc but
> it seems like a non-trivial uapi change but there might be few users
> that do clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec.

I believe the following code in Chromium explicitly relies on this
behavior, but I'm not sure whether this code is in active use anymore:

https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c;l=101?q=CLONE_FS&sq=&ss=chromium