Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1761707AbXF0Svi (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jun 2007 14:51:38 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755220AbXF0Sva (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jun 2007 14:51:30 -0400 Received: from e34.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.152]:54327 "EHLO e34.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752335AbXF0Sv3 (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Jun 2007 14:51:29 -0400 Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2007 13:51:25 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: James Morris , Kyle Moffett , Andreas Gruenbacher , Chris Wright , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morgan , Andrew Morton , Stephen Smalley , lkml , Arjan van de Ven , Greg KH , Eric Paris Subject: Re: [PATCH try #2] security: Convert LSM into a static interface Message-ID: <20070627185125.GA17059@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <20070617135239.GA17689@sergelap> <20070624220903.GB3723@sequoia.sous-sol.org> <200706252237.59226.agruen@suse.de> <11C35822-4E11-4365-BADE-C1AE41F15B50@mac.com> <20070626134712.GA8615@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <20070627134149.GB2679@sergelap> <20070627172102.GB16764@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20070627172102.GB16764@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1879 Lines: 46 Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com): > Quoting James Morris (jmorris@namei.org): > > On Wed, 27 Jun 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > > Quoting Kyle Moffett (mrmacman_g4@mac.com): > > > > This whole discussion boils down to 2 points: > > > > > > Yes it can, but not the two you list. > > > > > > > 1) As currently implemented, no LSM may be safely rmmod-ed > > > > > > That's not the rationale for the patch, it's just some talking point you > > > picked up. The rationale for the patch is to prevent abuse. > > > > This is not correct. Reducing API abuse is simply a bonus. > > > > The rationale for the patch is to remove unneeded infrastructure which > > complicates security by introducing the idea that the security module can > > be removed at all. > > > > It was in response to your very own posting about the new capabilities > > code which would need to take this into account. > > It's (IMO) by far not the optimal "solution" :) If it is felt a > solution is really needed, re-introduction of a > security_ops->module_exit hook and introduction of CAP_SYS_CAPDISABLE > would be better. > > But I'm well aware there are far too many (separate and not so separate) > agendas driving this, and have no expectations of being able to stop it. > > James, FWIW, I'm sorry I haven't had a chance to actually test the > patch. I'll try to get around to that today or at least this week. Patch tests fine for me for expected capability behavior with lsm=n, lsm=y, lsm=y+capability=y, lsm=y+selinux=y, and lsm=y+caps=y+selinux=y. So while I'm opposed to the patch, it appears to be safe. thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/