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Date:   Thu, 13 Oct 2022 20:18:04 -0700
From:   "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>
To:     "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
        "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc:     "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        "Jorge Merlino" <jorge.merlino@canonical.com>,
        "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
        "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        "Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
        "Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
        "Richard Haines" <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>,
        "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        "Xin Long" <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        "Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
        "Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
        "Prashanth Prahlad" <pprahlad@redhat.com>,
        "Micah Morton" <mortonm@chromium.org>,
        "Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
        "Andrei Vagin" <avagin@gmail.com>,
        "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec
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On Thu, Oct 6, 2022, at 7:13 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2022 at 11:05 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 06, 2022 at 01:27:34AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > The check_unsafe_exec() counting of n_fs would not add up under a heavily
>> > threaded process trying to perform a suid exec, causing the suid portion
>> > to fail. This counting error appears to be unneeded, but to catch any
>> > possible conditions, explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec, if it ends up
>>
>> Isn't this a potential uapi break? Afaict, before this change a call to
>> clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec in the child would have the
>> parent and child share fs information. So if the child e.g., changes the
>> working directory post exec it would also affect the parent. But after
>> this change here this would no longer be true. So a child changing a
>> workding directoro would not affect the parent anymore. IOW, an exec is
>> accompanied by an unshare(CLONE_FS). Might still be worth trying ofc but
>> it seems like a non-trivial uapi change but there might be few users
>> that do clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec.
>
> I believe the following code in Chromium explicitly relies on this
> behavior, but I'm not sure whether this code is in active use anymore:
>
> https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c;l=101?q=CLONE_FS&sq=&ss=chromium

Wait, this is absolutely nucking futs.  On a very quick inspection, the sharable things like this are fs, files, sighand, and io.    files and sighand get unshared, which makes sense.  fs supposedly checks for extra refs and prevents gaining privilege.  io is... ignored!  At least it's not immediately obvious that io is a problem.

But seriously, this makes no sense at all.  It should not be possible to exec a program and then, without ptrace, change its cwd out from under it.  Do we really need to preserve this behavior?

--Andy