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Date:   Fri, 14 Oct 2022 11:39:29 -0500
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Subject: Re: [RFC] EADDRINUSE from bind() on application restart after killing
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To:     Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc:     Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>,
        "open list:NETWORKING [TCP]" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
References: <5099dc39-c6d9-115a-855b-6aa98d17eb4b@collabora.com>
 <8dff3e46-6dac-af6a-1a3b-e6a8b93fdc60@collabora.com>
 <CANn89iLOdgExV3ydkg0r2iNwavSp5Zu9hskf34TTqmCZQCfUdA@mail.gmail.com>
 <5db967de-ea7e-9f35-cd74-d4cca2fcb9ee@codeweavers.com>
 <CANn89iJTNUCDLptS_rV4JUDcEH8JNXvOTx4xgzvaDHG6eodtXg@mail.gmail.com>
 <81b0e6c9-6c13-aecd-1e0e-6417eb89285f@codeweavers.com>
 <CANn89iKD=ceuLnhK-zpk3QerpS-FUb_wb_HevkpvsVqGJ_T4NQ@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Paul Gofman <pgofman@codeweavers.com>
In-Reply-To: <CANn89iKD=ceuLnhK-zpk3QerpS-FUb_wb_HevkpvsVqGJ_T4NQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Sorry if I was unclear, to reformulate my question, is blocking 
listening port (not the accept one) this way a IETF requirement? I am 
asking because I could not find where such a requirement stems from 
there. Sorry if I am missing the obvious.

On 10/14/22 11:34, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>       My question is if the behaviour of blocking listen socket port
>> while the accepted port (which, as I understand, does not have any
>> direct relation to listen port anymore from TCP standpoint) is still in
>> TIME_ or other wait is stipulated by TCP requirements which I am
>> missing? Or, if not, maybe that can be changed?
>>
> Please raise these questions at IETF, this is where major TCP changes
> need to be approved.
>
> There are multiple ways to avoid TIME_WAIT, if you really need to.
>
>
>> Thanks,
>>       Paul.
>>
>>
>> On 10/14/22 11:20, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>> On Fri, Oct 14, 2022 at 8:52 AM Paul Gofman <pgofman@codeweavers.com> wrote:
>>>> Hello Eric,
>>>>
>>>> our problem is actually not with the accept socket / port for which
>>>> those timeouts apply, we don't care for that temporary port number. The
>>>> problem is that the listen port (to which apps bind explicitly) is also
>>>> busy until the accept socket waits through all the necessary timeouts
>>>> and is fully closed. From my reading of TCP specs I don't understand why
>>>> it should be this way. The TCP hazards stipulating those timeouts seem
>>>> to apply to accept (connection) socket / port only. Shouldn't listen
>>>> socket's port (the only one we care about) be available for bind
>>>> immediately after the app stops listening on it (either due to closing
>>>> the listen socket or process force kill), or maybe have some other
>>>> timeouts not related to connected accept socket / port hazards? Or am I
>>>> missing something why it should be the way it is done now?
>>>>
>>> To quote your initial message :
>>>
>>> <quote>
>>> We are able to avoid this error by adding SO_REUSEADDR attribute to the
>>> socket in a hack. But this hack cannot be added to the application
>>> process as we don't own it.
>>> </quote>
>>>
>>> Essentially you are complaining of the linux kernel being unable to
>>> run a buggy application.
>>>
>>> We are not going to change the linux kernel because you can not
>>> fix/recompile an application.
>>>
>>> Note that you could use LD_PRELOAD, or maybe eBPF to automatically
>>> turn SO_REUSEADDR before bind()
>>>
>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>        Paul.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 9/30/22 10:16, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 6:24 AM Muhammad Usama Anjum
>>>>> <usama.anjum@collabora.com> wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Eric,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> RFC 1337 describes the TIME-WAIT Assassination Hazards in TCP. Because
>>>>>> of this hazard we have 60 seconds timeout in TIME_WAIT state if
>>>>>> connection isn't closed properly. From RFC 1337:
>>>>>>> The TIME-WAIT delay allows all old duplicate segments time
>>>>>> enough to die in the Internet before the connection is reopened.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As on localhost there is virtually no delay. I think the TIME-WAIT delay
>>>>>> must be zero for localhost connections. I'm no expert here. On localhost
>>>>>> there is no delay. So why should we wait for 60 seconds to mitigate a
>>>>>> hazard which isn't there?
>>>>> Because we do not specialize TCP stack for loopback.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is easy to force delays even for loopback (tc qdisc add dev lo root
>>>>> netem ...)
>>>>>
>>>>> You can avoid TCP complexity (cpu costs) over loopback using AF_UNIX instead.
>>>>>
>>>>> TIME_WAIT sockets are optional.
>>>>> If you do not like them, simply set /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_max_tw_buckets to 0 ?
>>>>>
>>>>>> Zapping the sockets in TIME_WAIT and FIN_WAIT_2 does removes them. But
>>>>>> zap is required from privileged (CAP_NET_ADMIN) process. We are having
>>>>>> hard time finding a privileged process to do this.
>>>>> Really, we are not going to add kludges in TCP stacks because of this reason.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>> Usama
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 5/24/22 1:18 PM, Muhammad Usama Anjum wrote:
>>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We have a set of processes which talk with each other through a local
>>>>>>> TCP socket. If the process(es) are killed (through SIGKILL) and
>>>>>>> restarted at once, the bind() fails with EADDRINUSE error. This error
>>>>>>> only appears if application is restarted at once without waiting for 60
>>>>>>> seconds or more. It seems that there is some timeout of 60 seconds for
>>>>>>> which the previous TCP connection remains alive waiting to get closed
>>>>>>> completely. In that duration if we try to connect again, we get the error.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We are able to avoid this error by adding SO_REUSEADDR attribute to the
>>>>>>> socket in a hack. But this hack cannot be added to the application
>>>>>>> process as we don't own it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've looked at the TCP connection states after killing processes in
>>>>>>> different ways. The TCP connection ends up in 2 different states with
>>>>>>> timeouts:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) Timeout associated with FIN_WAIT_1 state which is set through
>>>>>>> `tcp_fin_timeout` in procfs (60 seconds by default)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) Timeout associated with TIME_WAIT state which cannot be changed. It
>>>>>>> seems like this timeout has come from RFC 1337.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The timeout in (1) can be changed. Timeout in (2) cannot be changed. It
>>>>>>> also doesn't seem feasible to change the timeout of TIME_WAIT state as
>>>>>>> the RFC mentions several hazards. But we are talking about a local TCP
>>>>>>> connection where maybe those hazards aren't applicable directly? Is it
>>>>>>> possible to change timeout for TIME_WAIT state for only local
>>>>>>> connections without any hazards?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We have tested a hack where we replace timeout of TIME_WAIT state from a
>>>>>>> value in procfs for local connections. This solves our problem and
>>>>>>> application starts to work without any modifications to it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The question is that what can be the best possible solution here? Any
>>>>>>> thoughts will be very helpful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Muhammad Usama Anjum