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Message-ID: <2ce5e63dc4f15b8015fd7499120ff4256ad1f619.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] integrity: Prepare for having "ima" and "evm"
 available in "integrity" LSM
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= <mic@digikod.net>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Date:   Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:13:34 -0400
In-Reply-To: <202210191129.BFBF8035@keescook>
References: <20221013222702.never.990-kees@kernel.org>
         <20221013223654.659758-1-keescook@chromium.org>
         <08a8b202-69b4-e154-28f5-337a898acf61@digikod.net>
         <202210141050.A8DF7D10@keescook>
         <0d2b9d34-2eda-8aa6-d596-eb1899645192@digikod.net>
         <202210191129.BFBF8035@keescook>
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On Wed, 2022-10-19 at 11:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 11:26:44AM +0200, Micka?l Sala?n wrote:
> > 
> > On 14/10/2022 19:59, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 14, 2022 at 04:40:01PM +0200, Micka?l Sala?n wrote:
> > > > This is not backward compatible
> > > 
> > > Why? Nothing will be running LSM hooks until init finishes, at which
> > > point the integrity inode cache will be allocated. And ima and evm don't
> > > start up until lateinit.
> > > 
> > > > , but can easily be fixed thanks to
> > > > DEFINE_LSM().order
> > > 
> > > That forces the LSM to be enabled, which may not be desired?
> > 
> > This is not backward compatible because currently IMA is enabled
> > independently of the "lsm=" cmdline, which means that for all installed
> > systems using IMA and also with a custom "lsm=" cmdline, updating the kernel
> > with this patch will (silently) disable IMA. Using ".order =
> > LSM_ORDER_FIRST," should keep this behavior.
> 
> This isn't true. If "integrity" is removed from the lsm= line today, IMA
> will immediately panic:
> 
> process_measurement():
>   integrity_inode_get():
>         if (!iint_cache)
>                 panic("%s: lsm=integrity required.\n", __func__);
> 
> and before v5.12 (where the panic was added), it would immediately NULL
> deref. (And it took 3 years to even notice.)

Most people were/are still using the "security=" boot command line
option, not "lsm=".  This previously wasn't a problem with "security=",
but became a problem with "lsm=".  I should have been aware of the
change from "security=" to "lsm=", but unfortunately wasn't.  It took
me totally by surprise.   All of sudden "integrity" went from being a
common IMA/EVM resource to an LSM.  The correct solution would have
been to move it a different initcall.  (It's not too late to fix it.)

-- 
thanks,

Mimi