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Date:   Wed, 19 Oct 2022 15:58:27 -0500
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] virt: Prevent AES-GCM IV reuse in SNP guest driver
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To:     Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc:     Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
        Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com>,
        Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
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From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
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On 10/19/22 15:39, Peter Gonda wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 1:56 PM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 10/19/22 14:17, Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote:
>>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 11:44 AM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 10/19/22 12:40, Peter Gonda wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2022 at 11:03 AM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/19/22 10:03, Peter Gonda wrote:
>>>>>>> The ASP and an SNP guest use a series of AES-GCM keys called VMPCKs to
>>>>>>> communicate securely with each other. The IV to this scheme is a
>>>>>>> sequence number that both the ASP and the guest track. Currently this
>>>>>>> sequence number in a guest request must exactly match the sequence
>>>>>>> number tracked by the ASP. This means that if the guest sees an error
>>>>>>> from the host during a request it can only retry that exact request or
>>>>>>> disable the VMPCK to prevent an IV reuse. AES-GCM cannot tolerate IV
>>>>>>> reuse see:
>>>>>>> https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/block-cipher-techniques/documents/bcm/comments/800-38-series-drafts/gcm/joux_comments.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think I've wrapped my head around this now. Any non-zero return code
>>>> from the hypervisor for an SNP Guest Request is either a hypervisor error
>>>> or an sev-guest driver error, and so the VMPCK should be disabled. The
>>>> sev-guest driver is really doing everything (message headers, performing
>>>> the encryption, etc.) and is only using userspace data that will be part
>>>> of the response message and can't result in a non-zero hypervisor return code.
>>>>
>>>> For the SNP Extended Guest Request, we only need to special case a return
>>>> code of SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN. See below for my responses on that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> I wonder if we can at least still support the extended report length query
>>>>>> by having the kernel allocate the required pages when the error is
>>>>>> SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN and retry the exact request again. If there are
>>>>>> no errors on the second request, the sequence numbers can be safely
>>>>>> updated, but the kernel returns the original error (which will provide the
>>>>>> caller with the number of pages required).
>>>>>
>>>>> I think we can but I thought fixing the security bug could come first,
>>>>> then the usability fix after. Dionna was planning on working on that
>>>>> fix.
>>>>>
>>>>> In that flow how does userspace get the data? Its called the ioctl
>>>>> with not enough output buffer space. What if the userspace calls the
>>>>> ioctl with no buffers space allocated, so its trying to query the
>>>>> length. We just send the host the request without any encrypted data.
>>>>
>>>> In the case of SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN, userspace wouldn't get the data
>>>> if it hasn't supplied enough buffer space. But, the sev-guest driver can
>>>> supply enough buffer space and invoke the SNP Extended Guest Request again
>>>> in order to successfully complete the call and update the sequence
>>>> numbers. The sev-guest driver would just discard the data in this case,
>>>> but pass back the original "not enough buffer space" error to the caller,
>>>> who could now allocate space and retry. This then allows the sequence
>>>> numbers to be bumped properly.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The way I thought to solve this was to make certificate length
>>> querying a part of the specified protocol.
>>>
>>> The first ext_guest_request command /must/ query the certificate
>>> buffer length with req.certs_len == 0.
>>
>> This becomes an incompatible change to the GHCB specification.
>>
>>> By making this part of the protocol, the sev-guest driver can check if
>>> the certificate length has been requested before.
>>> If so, emulate the host's VMM error code for invalid length without
>>> sending an encrypted message.
>>
>> On the hypervisor side, the certificate blob can be replaced at any time
>> with a new blob that is larger. So you may still have to handle the case
>> where you get a SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN even if you previously asked before.
> 
> Ah, I forgot the host could keep changing the size of this data.
> 
>>
>>> If not, then send an all zeroes request buffer with the req.certs_len
>>> = 0 values to the VMM.
>>>
>>> The VMM will respond with the size if indeed the expected_pages are >
>>> 0. In the case that the host has not set the certificate buffer yet,
>>> then the host will inspect the header of the request page for a zero
>>> sequence number. If so, then we know that we don't have a valid
>>> request. We treat this also as the INVALID_LEN case but still return
>>> the size of 0. The driver will have the expected pages value stored as
>>> 0 at this point, so subsequent calls will not have this behavior.
>>>
>>> The way /dev/sev-guest user code has been written, I don't think this
>>> will break any existing software package.
>>
>> I think having the sev-guest driver re-issue the request with the internal
>> buffer when it receives SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN is the better way to go.
>> You could still cache the size request and always return that to
>> user-space when a request is received with a 0 length. The user-space
>> program must be able to handle receiving multiple
>> SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN in succession anyway, because of the fact that
>> the hypervisor can be updating the certs asynchronously. And if you get a
>> request that is not 0 length, then you issue it as such and re-use the
>> logic of the first 0 length request that was received if you get an
>> SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN with the user-space supplied value.
>>
>> Peter, is this something you could change the patch to do?
> 
> OK so the guest retires with the same request when it gets an
> SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN error. It expands its internal buffer to

It would just use the pre-allocated snp_dev->certs_data buffer with npages 
set to the full size of that buffer.

> hold the certificates. When it finally gets a successful request w/
> certs. Do we want to return the attestation bits to userspace, but
> leave out the certificate data. Or just error out the ioctl
> completely?

We need to be able to return the attestation bits that came back with the 
extra certs. So just error out of the ioctl with the length error and let 
user-space retry with the recommended number of pages.

> 
> I can do that in this series.

Thanks!

> 
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For the rate-limiting patch series [1], the rate-limiting will have to be
>>>>>> performed within the kernel, while the mutex is held, and then retry the
>>>>>> exact request again. Otherwise, that error will require disabling the
>>>>>> VMPCK. Either that, or the hypervisor must provide the rate limiting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thoughts?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221013160040.2858732-1-dionnaglaze@google.com/
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes I think if the host rate limits the guest. The guest kernel should
>>>>> retry the exact message. Which mutex are you referring too?
>>>>
>>>> Or the host waits and then submits the request and the guest kernel
>>>> doesn't have to do anything. The mutex I'm referring to is the
>>>> snp_cmd_mutex that is taken in snp_guest_ioctl().
>>>
>>> I think that either the host kernel or guest kernel waiting can lead
>>> to unacceptable delays.
>>> I would recommend that we add a zero argument ioctl to /dev/sev-guest
>>> specifically for retrying the last request.
>>>
>>> We can know what the last request is due to the sev_cmd_mutex serialization.
>>> The driver will just keep a scratch buffer for this. Any other request
>>> that comes in without resolving the retry will get an -EBUSY error
>>> code.
>>
>> And the first caller will have received an -EAGAIN in order to
>> differentiate between the two situations?
>>
>>>
>>> Calling the retry ioctl without a pending command will result in -EINVAL.
>>>
>>> Let me know what you think.
>>
>> I think that sounds reasonable, but there are some catches. You will need
>> to ensure that the caller that is supposed to retry does actually retry
>> and that a caller that does retry is the same caller that was told to retry.
> 
> Whats the issue with the guest driver taking some time?
> 
> This sounds complex because there may be many users of the driver. How
> do multiple users coordinate when they need to use the retry ioctl?
> 
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Tom
>>>
>>>
>>>