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From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
        linux-mm@kvack.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function
Date:   Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:08:15 -0700
Message-Id: <20221022180455.never.023-kees@kernel.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Precedence: bulk

With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the
logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change
the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users
wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an
allocation, or use krealloc() directly.

For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the
some of the partially open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize()
now that it doesn't perform unpoisoning.

Adjust the KUnit tests to match the new ksize() behavior.

Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
This requires at least this be landed first:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221021234713.you.031-kees@kernel.org/
I suspect given that is the most central ksize() user, this ksize()
fix might be best to land through the netdev tree...
---
 mm/kasan/kasan_test.c |  8 +++++---
 mm/slab_common.c      | 33 ++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
index 0d59098f0876..cb5c54adb503 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
 }
 
-/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
+/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
 static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	char *ptr;
@@ -791,15 +791,17 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
 
 	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
 	real_size = ksize(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
 
 	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
 
 	/* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
-	ptr[size] = 'x';
+	ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
 
 	/* This one must. */
-	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
 
 	kfree(ptr);
 }
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 33b1886b06eb..eabd66fcabd0 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1333,11 +1333,11 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
-	/* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
+	/* Check for double-free before calling ksize. */
 	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
 		if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
 			return NULL;
-		ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
+		ks = ksize(p);
 	} else
 		ks = 0;
 
@@ -1405,8 +1405,10 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
 	void *mem = (void *)p;
 
 	ks = ksize(mem);
-	if (ks)
+	if (ks) {
+		kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks);
 		memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
+	}
 	kfree(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
@@ -1415,10 +1417,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
  * ksize - get the actual amount of memory allocated for a given object
  * @objp: Pointer to the object
  *
- * kmalloc may internally round up allocations and return more memory
+ * kmalloc() may internally round up allocations and return more memory
  * than requested. ksize() can be used to determine the actual amount of
- * memory allocated. The caller may use this additional memory, even though
- * a smaller amount of memory was initially specified with the kmalloc call.
+ * allocated memory. The caller may NOT use this additional memory, unless
+ * it calls krealloc(). To avoid an alloc/realloc cycle, callers can use
+ * kmalloc_size_roundup() to find the size of the associated kmalloc bucket.
  * The caller must guarantee that objp points to a valid object previously
  * allocated with either kmalloc() or kmem_cache_alloc(). The object
  * must not be freed during the duration of the call.
@@ -1427,13 +1430,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
  */
 size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 {
-	size_t size;
-
 	/*
-	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
-	 * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
-	 * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
-	 * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
+	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid.
+	 * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when
+	 * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to
+	 * a potential use-after-free or double-free.
 	 *
 	 * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
 	 * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
@@ -1447,13 +1448,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
-	/*
-	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
-	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
-	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
-	return size;
+	return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
 
-- 
2.34.1