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[2620:137:e000::1:20]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c12-20020a056a00248c00b00545c63d5387si33088557pfv.21.2022.10.23.02.13.49; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 02:14:19 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) client-ip=2620:137:e000::1:20; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 2620:137:e000::1:20 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229961AbiJWHwc (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 23 Oct 2022 03:52:32 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:38126 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229610AbiJWHwb (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Oct 2022 03:52:31 -0400 Received: from mail.steuer-voss.de (mail.steuer-voss.de [85.183.69.95]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C26B73925; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 00:52:28 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at mail.steuer-voss.de Received: by mail.steuer-voss.de (Postfix, from userid 1000) id BD069135D; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 09:52:20 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.steuer-voss.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA59212E7; Sun, 23 Oct 2022 09:52:20 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2022 09:52:20 +0200 (CEST) From: Nikolaus Voss To: Jarkko Sakkinen cc: Mimi Zohar , David Howells , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Yael Tzur , Cyril Hrubis , Petr Vorel , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: <20221013064308.857011E25@mail.steuer-voss.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, 23 Oct 2022, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:18:58AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >> On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 08:39:58AM +0200, Nikolaus Voss wrote: >>> Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided >>> decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. >>> The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. >>> Fix this to use hex2bin instead. >>> >>> Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" >>> are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the >>> old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a >>> small shell script, e.g.: >>> >>> BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa >>> NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) >>> keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u >>> keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u >>> >>> It is encouraged to switch to a new key because the effective key size >>> of the old keys is only half of the specified size. >>> >>> The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been >>> fixed (see link below). >>> >>> Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") >>> Cc: stable >>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/ >>> Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss >>> --- >>> Changes >>> ======= >>> v4: - fixed link >>> v3: - use generated random key in example, reformat commit message >>> v2: - clarify commit message, add example to recover old/broken keys >>> - improve example in Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> - add link to ltp patch >>> >>> Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 3 ++- >>> security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 6 +++--- >>> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> index 0bfb4c339748..9bc9db8ec651 100644 >>> --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst >>> @@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: >>> >>> Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data:: >>> >>> - $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u >>> + $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p) >>> + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u >>> 794890253 >>> >>> $ keyctl print 794890253 >>> diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c >>> index e05cfc2e49ae..1e313982af02 100644 >>> --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c >>> +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c >>> @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key, >>> pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n"); >>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); >>> } >>> - if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) { >>> + if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) { >>> pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n"); >>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); >>> } >>> @@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, >>> ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv); >>> } else if (decrypted_data) { >>> get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize); >>> - memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, >>> - epayload->decrypted_datalen); >>> + ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, >>> + epayload->decrypted_datalen); >>> } else { >>> get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize); >>> get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen); >>> -- >>> 2.34.1 >>> >> >> >> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen >> >> Unless there is opposing views, I can pick this. > > Actually, taking this back: please fix the checkpatch warnings first. I fixed the warnings in v5, Mimi took this already. Niko