Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1760160AbXHCC2Y (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Aug 2007 22:28:24 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756691AbXHCC2N (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Aug 2007 22:28:13 -0400 Received: from pentafluge.infradead.org ([213.146.154.40]:41654 "EHLO pentafluge.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754244AbXHCC2M (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Aug 2007 22:28:12 -0400 Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2007 08:10:35 +0530 (IST) From: Satyam Sharma X-X-Sender: satyam@enigma.security.iitk.ac.in To: Stefan Walter cc: Steve Dickson , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: rpc.mountd crashes when extensively using netgroups In-Reply-To: <46B19E0A.5040605@inf.ethz.ch> Message-ID: References: <46ADDFB2.9070709@inf.ethz.ch> <46AF4034.6080507@RedHat.com> <46B19E0A.5040605@inf.ethz.ch> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3259 Lines: 83 Hi, On Thu, 2 Aug 2007, Stefan Walter wrote: > Steve Dickson wrote: > > Stefan Walter wrote: > >> > >> We do this on a much larger scale though. The bug we ran into is > >> in line 96 in utils/mountd/auth.c. The strcpy can corrupt > >> memory when it copies the string returned by client_compose() to > >> my_client.m_hostname which has a fixed size of 1024 bytes. For our > >> example above, client_compose() returns "@joe,@jane" > >> for any machine in the offices_1 netgroup. Unfortunately we have > >> a machine to which roughly 150 netgroups like @joe or @jane >> export to and client_compose() returns a string over 1300 bytes > >> long and rpc.mountd nicely segfaults. > >> > >> To prevent the crash is of course trivial: Inserting a simple > >> 'if (strlen(n) > 1024) return NULL;' before line 96 does the job. > > Does the attached patch help? > > > rpc.mountd does not crash anymore but I get a 'permission denied' when > trying > to mount a share. Doing an 'strace rpc.mountd -F' reveals: > > ... > open("/proc/net/rpc/auth.unix.ip/channel", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, > 0666) = 9 > fstat64(9, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 > mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, > 0) = 0xb7f41000 > time(NULL) = 1186041882 > write(9, "nfsd 129.132.10.33 1186043682 @a"..., 1024) = -1 EINVAL > (Invalid argument) > write(9, "\n", 1) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) > close(9) = 0 > munmap(0xb7f41000, 4096) = 0 > open("/proc/net/rpc/nfsd.export/channel", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, > 0666) = 9 > fstat64(9, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 > mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, > 0) = 0xb7f41000 > write(9, "@anbuehle,@anhorni,@antoinet,@ap"..., 1024) = -1 EINVAL > (Invalid argument) > time(NULL) = 1186041882 > write(9, "/export/groups/grossm/h1/home/gr"..., 68) = -1 ENOENT (No such > file or directory) > close(9) = 0 > munmap(0xb7f41000, 4096) = 0 > open("/proc/fs/nfsd/filehandle", O_RDWR) = 9 > fstat64(9, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0600, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 > mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, > 0) = 0xb7f41000 > write(9, "@anbuehle,@anhorni,@antoinet,@ap"..., 1066) = -1 EPERM > (Operation not permitted) > ... Yup, the snprintf() in the patch would've truncated the input string. Steve (D), you should check the return of snprintf() and compare against the size specified (NFSCLNT_IDMAX+1) and do a graceful cleanup + print an error message to the user, when detecting truncation of input: err = snprintf(my_client.m_hostname, (NFSCLNT_IDMAX+1), "%s", *n?n:"DEFAULT"); if (err >= (NFSCLNT_IDMAX+1)) { printf("too large input string ...\n"); /* cleanups and graceful exit */ } Sorry, I don't have rpc.mountd sources nearby, so cannot make a patch myself (I'm an exclusively kernel guy :-) Thanks, Satyam - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/