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References: <20221118172305.3321253-1-glider@google.com> <Y3tRgGUKCxUoLeM8@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
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From:   Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 21 Nov 2022 11:28:39 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=Wpy8KA0cLBHapd7BdtnPHsRTpYip+z9TjfB1aUHUGH3g@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: suppress KMSAN reports in arch_within_stack_frames()
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc:     tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
        dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 11:23 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrot=
e:
>
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 06:23:05PM +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > arch_within_stack_frames() performs stack walking and may confuse
> > KMSAN by stepping on stale shadow values. To prevent false positive
> > reports, disable KMSAN checks in this function.
> >
> > This fixes KMSAN's interoperability with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
> >
> > Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/89
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y3b9AAEKp2Vr3e6O@sol.localdomain/
> > Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 +++++
> >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/=
thread_info.h
> > index f0cb881c1d690..f1cccba52eb97 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > @@ -163,7 +163,12 @@ struct thread_info {
> >   *   GOOD_FRAME      if within a frame
> >   *   BAD_STACK       if placed across a frame boundary (or outside sta=
ck)
> >   *   NOT_STACK       unable to determine (no frame pointers, etc)
> > + *
> > + * This function reads pointers from the stack and dereferences them. =
The
> > + * pointers may not have their KMSAN shadow set up properly, which may=
 result
> > + * in false positive reports. Disable instrumentation to avoid those.
> >   */
> > +__no_kmsan_checks
> >  static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack,
> >                                          const void * const stackend,
> >                                          const void *obj, unsigned long=
 len)
>
> Seems OK; but now I'm confused as to the exact distinction between
> __no_sanitize_memory and __no_kmsan_checks.
>
> The comments there about seem to suggest __no_sanitize_memory ensures no
> instrumentation at all, and __no_kmsan_checks some instrumentation but
> doesn't actually check anything -- so what's left then?

__no_sanitize_memory prohibits all instrumentation whatsoever, whereas
__no_kmsan_checks adds instrumentation that suppresses potential false
positives around this function.

Quoting include/linux/compiler-clang.h:

/*
 * The __no_kmsan_checks attribute ensures that a function does not produce
 * false positive reports by:
 *  - initializing all local variables and memory stores in this function;
 *  - skipping all shadow checks;
 *  - passing initialized arguments to this function's callees.
 */

Does this answer your question?

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Alexander Potapenko
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