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Date:   Mon, 21 Nov 2022 10:39:56 -0500
From:   Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To:     KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc:     Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
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        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/1] BPF tracing for arm64 using fprobe
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On Mon, 21 Nov 2022 16:29:54 +0100
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> wrote:

> I am not sure how they can circumvent security since this needs root /
> root equivalent permissions. Fault injection is actually a very useful
> debugging tool.

On ChromeOS, we even consider root untrusted and lock down pretty
much all privileged activities (like loading modules and such).

As you said. It's a good debugging tool. Not something to allow in
production environments. Or at the very least, allow admins to disable it.

-- Steve