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From:   Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
        Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc:     Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>,
        Wenjie Li <wenjieli@qti.qualcomm.com>,
        =?UTF-8?q?David=20Wang=20=E7=8E=8B=E6=A0=87?= 
        <wangbiao3@xiaomi.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH-tip] sched: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()
Date:   Sun, 27 Nov 2022 20:44:41 -0500
Message-Id: <20221128014441.1264867-1-longman@redhat.com>
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Precedence: bulk

Since commit 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be
restricted on asymmetric systems"), the setting and clearing of
user_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,
dup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock
protection. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and
double-free in arm64 kernel.

Commit 8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested
cpumask") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never
be cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced
in commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in
do_set_cpus_allowed()") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
do_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.

Fix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly
cloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the
user_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.

Note to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.
Just copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.

Fixes: 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems")
Fixes: 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed()")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Wang 王标 <wangbiao3@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 8df51b08bb38..f2b75faaf71a 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2624,19 +2624,43 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
 int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
 		      int node)
 {
+	cpumask_t *user_mask;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * Always clear dst->user_cpus_ptr first as their user_cpus_ptr's
+	 * may differ by now due to racing.
+	 */
+	dst->user_cpus_ptr = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * This check is racy and losing the race is a valid situation.
+	 * It is not worth the extra overhead of taking the pi_lock on
+	 * every fork/clone.
+	 */
 	if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)
 		return 0;
 
-	dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
-	if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr)
+	user_mask = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
+	if (!user_mask)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	/* Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr */
+	/*
+	 * Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr
+	 *
+	 * Though unlikely, user_cpus_ptr can be reset to NULL by a concurrent
+	 * do_set_cpus_allowed().
+	 */
 	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags);
-	cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
+	if (src->user_cpus_ptr) {
+		swap(dst->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
+		cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
+	}
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&src->pi_lock, flags);
+
+	if (unlikely(user_mask))
+		kfree(user_mask);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.31.1