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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2022 16:35:30 -0800 Message-Id: <20221203003606.6838-4-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20221203003606.6838-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Yu-cheng Yu The Control-Flow Enforcement Technology contains two related features, one of which is Shadow Stacks. Future patches will utilize this feature for shadow stack support in KVM, so add a CPU feature flags for Shadow Stacks (CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7]). To protect shadow stack state from malicious modification, the registers are only accessible in supervisor mode. This implementation context-switches the registers with XSAVES. Make X86_FEATURE_SHSTK depend on XSAVES. The shadow stack feature, enumerated by the CPUID bit described above, encompasses both supervisor and userspace support for shadow stack. In near future patches, only userspace shadow stack will be enabled. In expectation of future supervisor shadow stack support, create a software CPU capability to enumerate kernel utilization of userspace shadow stack support. This will also allow for userspace shadow stack to be disabled, while leaving the shadow stack hardware capability exposed in the cpuinfo proc. This user shadow stack bit should depend on the HW "shstk" capability and that logic will be implemented in future patches. Tested-by: Pengfei Xu Tested-by: John Allen Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Cc: Kees Cook --- v3: - Add user specific shadow stack cpu cap (Andrew Cooper) - Drop reviewed-bys from Boris and Kees due to the above change. v2: - Remove IBT reference in commit log (Kees) - Describe xsaves dependency using text from (Dave) v1: - Remove IBT, can be added in a follow on IBT series. Yu-cheng v25: - Make X86_FEATURE_IBT depend on X86_FEATURE_SHSTK. arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 11a0e06362e4..aab7fa4104d7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA (11*32+18) /* "" SGX EDECCSSA user leaf function */ #define X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH (11*32+19) /* "" Call depth tracking for RSB stuffing */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+20) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK (11*32+21) /* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ @@ -369,6 +370,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */ #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5) /* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */ #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index c44b56f7ffba..7a2954a16cb7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ # define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31)) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif + /* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */ @@ -114,7 +120,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX) #define DISABLED_MASK10 0 #define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET| \ - DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) + DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING|DISABLE_USER_SHSTK) #define DISABLED_MASK12 0 #define DISABLED_MASK13 0 #define DISABLED_MASK14 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c index d95221117129..c3e4e5246df9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, X86_FEATURE_XFD }, + { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, {} }; -- 2.17.1