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Message-ID: <fcde9247-55cb-b402-987b-66f24dc76271@intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 11 Jan 2023 15:23:52 -0800
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86/cpu: Enumerate LASS CPUID and CR4 bits
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To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
        <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
        Paul Lai <paul.c.lai@intel.com>
References: <20230110055204.3227669-1-yian.chen@intel.com>
 <20230110055204.3227669-2-yian.chen@intel.com>
 <9d935618-8f84-2d6e-4f4c-9d38eec2ba67@intel.com>
 <feab0dd1-2030-e31c-cbbf-9857c46d0c1c@intel.com>
From:   "Chen, Yian" <yian.chen@intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <feab0dd1-2030-e31c-cbbf-9857c46d0c1c@intel.com>
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On 1/10/2023 4:13 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 1/10/23 12:14, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> On 1/9/2023 9:51 PM, Yian Chen wrote:
>>> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a CPU feature to
>>> prevent speculative address access in user/kernel mode.
>>
>> Would it be better to say?
>>
>> LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is a security feature that
>> intends to prevent unintentional speculative address access across
>> user/kernel mode.
> 
> It's more than that, though.  The spec actually says this pretty nicely:
> >> Linear-address space separation (LASS) is an independent mechanism
>> that enforces the same mode-based protections as paging but without
>> traversing the paging structures. Because the protections enforced by
>> LASS are applied before paging, “probes” by malicious software will
>> provide no paging-based timing information
> 
> So, it's not _just_ that it can prevent some speculative accesses.  It
> completely short-circuits paging itself and *ALL* of the baggage that
> goes along with paging.
> 
> The TLB, mid-level caches, the page walker itself, the data cache
> impact...  all of it.  Gone.
> 
> *THAT* is the important part here, IMNHO.
sure, how about if I rewrite the 1st paragraph as follows:

LASS (Linear Address Space Separation) is an independent security 
mechanism that enforces kernel and user mode-base protections, similar 
to Intel SMAP/SMEP in kernel mode, but enhanced without traversing the 
paging structures. Therefore, the protection will not leak paging-based 
timing information and prevent malicious software from probing the info. 
The LASS details have been published in Chapter 11 in
https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/671368