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[85.226.165.230]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id p20-20020a2e9a94000000b00289bb528b8dsm725473lji.49.2023.01.13.07.35.16 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 13 Jan 2023 07:35:16 -0800 (PST) From: Alexander Larsson To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gscrivan@redhat.com, Alexander Larsson , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] composefs: Add documentation Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 16:33:58 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.0 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Adds documentation about the composefs filesystem and how to use it. Signed-off-by: Alexander Larsson --- Documentation/filesystems/composefs.rst | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/filesystems/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 170 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/composefs.rst diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/composefs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/composefs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..306f0e2e22ba --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/composefs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==================== +Composefs Filesystem +==================== + +Introduction +============ + +Composefs is a read-only file system that is backed by regular files +(rather than a block device). It is designed to help easily share +content between different directory trees, such as container images in +a local store or ostree checkouts. In addition it also has support for +integrity validation of file content and directory metadata, in an +efficient way (using fs-verity). + +The filesystem mount source is a binary blob called the descriptor. It +contains all the inode and directory entry data for the entire +filesystem. However, instead of storing the file content each regular +file inode stores a relative path name, and the filesystem gets the +file content from the filesystem by looking up that filename in a set +of base directories. + +Given such a descriptor called "image.cfs" and a directory with files +called "/dir" you can mount it like:: + + mount -t composefs image.cfs -o basedir=/dir /mnt + +Content sharing +=============== + +Suppose you have a single basedir where the files are content +addressed (i.e. named by content digest), and a set of composefs +descriptors using this basedir. Any file that happen to be shared +between two images (same content, so same digest) will now only be +stored once on the disk. + +Such sharing is possible even if the metadata for the file in the +image differs (common reasons for metadata difference are mtime, +permissions, xattrs, etc). The sharing is also anonymous in the sense +that you can't tell the difference on the mounted files from a +non-shared file (for example by looking at the link count for a +hardlinked file). + +In addition, any shared files that are actively in use will share +page-cache, because the page cache for the file contents will be +addressed by the backing file in the basedir, This means (for example) +that shared libraries between images will only be mmap:ed once across +all mounts. + +Integrity validation +==================== + +Composefs uses :doc:`fs-verity ` for integrity validation, +and extends it by making the validation also apply to the directory +metadata. This happens on two levels, validation of the descriptor +and validation of the backing files. + +For descriptor validation, the idea is that you enable fs-verity on +the descriptor file which seals it from changes that would affect the +directory metadata. Additionally you can pass a `digest` mount option, +which composefs verifies against the descriptor fs-verity +measure. Such a mount option could be encoded in a trusted source +(like a signed kernel command line) and be used as a root of trust if +using composefs for the root filesystem. + +For file validation, the descriptor can contain digest for each +backing file, and you can enable fs-verity on the backing +files. Composefs will validate the digest before using the backing +files. This means any (accidental or malicious) modification of the +basedir will be detected at the time the file is used. + +Expected use-cases +================== + +Container Image Storage +``````````````````````` + +Typically a container image is stored as a set of "layer" +directories. merged into one mount by using overlayfs. The lower +layers are read-only image content and the upper layer is the +writable state of a running container. Multiple uses of the same +layer can be shared this way, but it is hard to share individual +files between unrelated layers. + +Using composefs, we can instead use a shared, content-addressed +store for all the images in the system, and use a composefs image +for the read-only image content of each image, pointing into the +shared store. Then for a running container we use an overlayfs +with the lower dir being the composefs and the upper dir being +the writable state. + + +Ostree root filesystem validation +````````````````````````````````` + +Ostree uses a content-addressed on-disk store for file content, +allowing efficient updates and sharing of content. However to actually +use these as a root filesystem it needs to create a real +"chroot-style" directory, containing hard links into the store. The +store itself is validated when created, but once the hard-link +directory is created, nothing validates the directory structure of +that. + +Instead of a chroot we can we can use composefs. We create a composefs +image pointing into the object store, enable fs-verity for everything +and encode the fs-verity digest of the descriptor in the +kernel-command line. This will allow booting a trusted system where +all directory metadata and file content is validated lazily at use. + + +Mount options +============= + +basedir + A colon separated list of directories to use as a base when resolving + relative content paths. + +verity_check=[0,1,2] + When to verify backing file fs-verity: 0 == never, 1 == if specified in + image, 2 == always and require it in image. + +digest + A fs-verity sha256 digest that the descriptor file must match. If set, + `verity_check` defaults to 2. + + +Filesystem format +================= + +The format of the descriptor is contains three sections: header, +inodes and variable data. All data in the file is stored in +little-endian form. + +The header starts at the beginning of the file and contains version, +magic value, offsets to the variable data and the root inode nr. + +The inode section starts at a fixed location right after the +header. It is a array of inode data, where for each inode there is +first a variable length chunk and then a fixed size chunk. An inode nr +is the offset in the inode data to the start of the fixed chunk. + +The fixed inode chunk starts with a flag that tells what parts of the +inode are stored in the file (meaning it is only the maximal size that +is fixed). After that the various inode attributes are serialized in +order, such as mode, ownership, xattrs, and payload length. The +payload length attribute gives the size of the variable chunk. + +The inode variable chunk contains different things depending on the +file type. For regular files it is the backing filename. For symlinks +it is the symlink target. For directories it is a list of references to +dentries, stored in chunks of maximum 4k. The dentry chunks themselves +are stored in the variable data section. + +The variable data section is stored after the inode section, and you +can find it from the offset in the header. It contains dentries and +Xattrs data. The xattrs are referred to by offset and size in the +xattr attribute in the inode data. Each xattr data can be used by many +inodes in the filesystem. The variable data chunks are all smaller than +a page (4K) and are padded to not span pages. + +Tools +===== + +Tools for composefs can be found at https://github.com/containers/composefs + +There is a mkcomposefs tool which can be used to create images on the +CLI, and a library that applications can use to create composefs +images. diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/index.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/index.rst index bee63d42e5ec..9b7cf136755d 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/index.rst @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ Documentation for filesystem implementations. cifs/index ceph coda + composefs configfs cramfs dax -- 2.39.0