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[34.168.104.7]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d12-20020a634f0c000000b0047829d1b8eesm9819354pgb.31.2023.01.13.15.12.56 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 13 Jan 2023 15:12:56 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2023 23:12:53 +0000 From: Sean Christopherson To: Chao Peng Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Arnd Bergmann , Naoya Horiguchi , Miaohe Lin , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Hugh Dickins , Jeff Layton , "J . Bruce Fields" , Andrew Morton , Shuah Khan , Mike Rapoport , Steven Price , "Maciej S . Szmigiero" , Vlastimil Babka , Vishal Annapurve , Yu Zhang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , luto@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com, aarcange@redhat.com, ddutile@redhat.com, dhildenb@redhat.com, Quentin Perret , tabba@google.com, Michael Roth , mhocko@suse.com, wei.w.wang@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 7/9] KVM: Update lpage info when private/shared memory are mixed Message-ID: References: <20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> <20221202061347.1070246-8-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20221202061347.1070246-8-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_MED, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL,USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Dec 02, 2022, Chao Peng wrote: > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index 283cbb83d6ae..7772ab37ac89 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ > #include > > #define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_VCPU_DEBUGFS > +#define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES No need for this, I think we should just make it mandatory to implement the arch hook when CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES=y. If another arch gains support for mem attributes and doesn't need the hook, then we can simply add a weak helper (or maybe add a #define then if we feel that's the way to go). > #define KVM_MAX_VCPUS 1024 > > @@ -1011,6 +1012,13 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch { > #endif > }; > > +/* > + * Use a bit in disallow_lpage to indicate private/shared pages mixed at the > + * level. The remaining bits are used as a reference count. > + */ > +#define KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED (1U << 31) Similar to the need to unmap, I think we should just say "mixed" and ignore the private vs. shared, i.e. make this a flag for all memory attributes. > +#define KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX ((1U << 31) - 1) "MAX" is technically correct, but it's more of a mask. I think we can make it a moot point though. There's no need to mask the count, we just want to assert that adjusting the counting doesn't change the flag. I would also say throw these defines into mmu.c, at least pending the bug fix for kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata() (more on that below). > struct kvm_lpage_info { > int disallow_lpage; > }; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > index e2c70b5afa3e..2190fd8c95c0 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > @@ -763,11 +763,16 @@ static void update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > { > struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; > int i; > + int disallow_count; > > for (i = PG_LEVEL_2M; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) { > linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, i); > + > + disallow_count = linfo->disallow_lpage & KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX; > + WARN_ON(disallow_count + count < 0 || > + disallow_count > KVM_LPAGE_COUNT_MAX - count); > + > linfo->disallow_lpage += count; > - WARN_ON(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0); It's been a long week so don't trust my math, but I believe this can simply be: old = linfo->disallow_lpage; linfo->disallow_lpage += count; WARN_ON_ONCE((old ^ linfo->disallow_lpage) & KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG); > } > } > > @@ -6986,3 +6991,130 @@ void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) > if (kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread) > kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread); > } > + > +static bool linfo_is_mixed(struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo) > +{ > + return linfo->disallow_lpage & KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED; > +} > + > +static void linfo_set_mixed(gfn_t gfn, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > + int level, bool mixed) > +{ > + struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level); > + > + if (mixed) > + linfo->disallow_lpage |= KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED; > + else > + linfo->disallow_lpage &= ~KVM_LPAGE_PRIVATE_SHARED_MIXED; > +} > + > +static bool is_expected_attr_entry(void *entry, unsigned long expected_attrs) > +{ > + bool expect_private = expected_attrs & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE; > + > + if (xa_to_value(entry) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE) { > + if (!expect_private) > + return false; > + } else if (expect_private) > + return false; This is messy. If we drop the private vs. shared specifity, this can go away if we add a helper to get attributes static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) { return xa_to_value(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn)); } and then we can do if (KVM_BUG_ON(gfn != xas.xa_index, kvm) || attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn)) { mixed = true; break; } and if (linfo_is_mixed(lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level - 1)) || attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn)) return true; > + > + return true; > +} > + > +static bool mem_attrs_mixed_2m(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > +{ > + XA_STATE(xas, &kvm->mem_attr_array, start); > + gfn_t gfn = start; > + void *entry; > + bool mixed = false; > + > + rcu_read_lock(); > + entry = xas_load(&xas); > + while (gfn < end) { > + if (xas_retry(&xas, entry)) > + continue; > + > + KVM_BUG_ON(gfn != xas.xa_index, kvm); As above, I think it's worth bailing immediately if there's a mismatch. > + > + if (!is_expected_attr_entry(entry, attrs)) { > + mixed = true; > + break; > + } > + > + entry = xas_next(&xas); > + gfn++; > + } > + > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return mixed; > +} > + > +static bool mem_attrs_mixed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, s/mem_attrs_mixed/has_mixed_attrs to make it clear this is querying, not setting. And has_mixed_attrs_2m() above. > + int level, unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > +{ > + unsigned long gfn; > + > + if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M) > + return mem_attrs_mixed_2m(kvm, attrs, start, end); > + > + for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn += KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1)) Curly braces needed on the for-loop. > + if (linfo_is_mixed(lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level - 1)) || > + !is_expected_attr_entry(xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, gfn), > + attrs)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > +static void kvm_update_lpage_private_shared_mixed(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > + unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > +{ > + unsigned long pages, mask; > + gfn_t gfn, gfn_end, first, last; > + int level; > + bool mixed; > + > + /* > + * The sequence matters here: we set the higher level basing on the > + * lower level's scanning result. > + */ > + for (level = PG_LEVEL_2M; level <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; level++) { > + pages = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level); > + mask = ~(pages - 1); > + first = start & mask; > + last = (end - 1) & mask; > + > + /* > + * We only need to scan the head and tail page, for middle pages > + * we know they will not be mixed. > + */ > + gfn = max(first, slot->base_gfn); > + gfn_end = min(first + pages, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages); > + mixed = mem_attrs_mixed(kvm, slot, level, attrs, gfn, gfn_end); > + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, mixed); > + > + if (first == last) > + return; > + > + for (gfn = first + pages; gfn < last; gfn += pages) > + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, false); > + > + gfn = last; > + gfn_end = min(last + pages, slot->base_gfn + slot->npages); > + mixed = mem_attrs_mixed(kvm, slot, level, attrs, gfn, gfn_end); > + linfo_set_mixed(gfn, slot, level, mixed); > + } > +} > + > +void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > + unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > +{ > + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) Make this an early return optimization, with a comment explaining that KVM x86 doesn't yet support other attributes. /* * KVM x86 currently only supports KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, skip * the slot if the slot will never consume the PRIVATE attribute. */ if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) return; > + kvm_update_lpage_private_shared_mixed(kvm, slot, attrs, > + start, end); > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index 9a07380f8d3c..5aefcff614d2 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -12362,6 +12362,8 @@ static int kvm_alloc_memslot_metadata(struct kvm *kvm, > if ((slot->base_gfn + npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1)) > linfo[lpages - 1].disallow_lpage = 1; > ugfn = slot->userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + if (kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) > + ugfn |= slot->restricted_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; I would rather reject memslot if the gfn has lesser alignment than the offset. I'm totally ok with this approach _if_ there's a use case. Until such a use case presents itself, I would rather be conservative from a uAPI perspective. > /* > * If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each > * other, disable large page support for this slot. > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > index 3331c0c92838..25099c94e770 100644 > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h > @@ -592,6 +592,11 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot { > struct restrictedmem_notifier notifier; > }; > > +static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > +{ > + return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_PRIVATE); KVM_MEM_PRIVATE should really be defined only when private memory is exposed to userspace. For this patch, even though it means we have untestable code, I think it makes sense to "return false". > +} > + > static inline bool kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) > { > return slot->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES; > @@ -2316,4 +2321,18 @@ static inline void kvm_account_pgtable_pages(void *virt, int nr) > /* Max number of entries allowed for each kvm dirty ring */ > #define KVM_DIRTY_RING_MAX_ENTRIES 65536 > > +#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES > +void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > + unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end); > +#else > +static inline void kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, > + unsigned long attrs, > + gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > +{ > +} > +#endif /* __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */ As above, no stub is necessary. > #endif > diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > index 4e1e1e113bf0..e107afea32f0 100644 > --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c > @@ -2354,7 +2354,8 @@ static u64 kvm_supported_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm) > return 0; > } > > -static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end) Feedback for an earlier patch (to avoid churn): this should be kvm_mem_attrs_changed() or so now that this does more than just unmap. > +static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end, > + unsigned long attrs) Weird nit. I think we should keep the prototypes for kvm_mem_attrs_changed() and kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes() somewhat similar, i.e. squeeze in @attrs before @start. > { > struct kvm_gfn_range gfn_range; > struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; > @@ -2378,6 +2379,10 @@ static void kvm_unmap_mem_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end) > gfn_range.slot = slot; > > r |= kvm_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, &gfn_range); > + > + kvm_arch_set_memory_attributes(kvm, slot, attrs, > + gfn_range.start, > + gfn_range.end); > } > } > > @@ -2427,7 +2432,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, > idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); > KVM_MMU_LOCK(kvm); > if (i > start) > - kvm_unmap_mem_range(kvm, start, i); > + kvm_unmap_mem_range(kvm, start, i, attrs->attributes); > kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm); > KVM_MMU_UNLOCK(kvm); > srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx); > -- > 2.25.1 >