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Subject: [PATCH v7 6/7] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Date:   Mon, 16 Jan 2023 17:01:58 -0600
Message-ID: <20230116230159.1511393-7-kim.phillips@amd.com>
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The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.

It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like
Intel's Enhanced IBRS, h/w manages its IBRS mitigation
resources automatically across CPL transitions.

The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is
enabled by setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.

Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present.
It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent
generic retpolines mitigation.

Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum.
AMD Automatic IBRS and Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar
bugs.c enablement.  Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist,
since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.

The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is
used to select AMD Automatic IBRS, if available.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |  6 +++---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 20 +++++++++++--------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 19 ++++++++++--------
 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index c4dcdb3d0d45..3fe6511c5405 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ kernel command line.
                 retpoline,generic       Retpolines
                 retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
                 retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
-                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
-                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
                 ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6cfa6e3996cf..839fa0fefb58 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5729,9 +5729,9 @@
 			retpoline,generic - Retpolines
 			retpoline,lfence  - LFENCE; indirect branch
 			retpoline,amd     - alias for retpoline,lfence
-			eibrs		  - enhanced IBRS
-			eibrs,retpoline   - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-			eibrs,lfence      - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+			eibrs		  - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+			eibrs,retpoline   - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+			eibrs,lfence      - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
 			ibrs		  - use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 861d312c7955..d5acc4dc5906 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP	(20*32+ 0) /* "" AMD No Nested Data Breakpoints */
 #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC	(20*32+ 2) /* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE	(20*32+ 6) /* "" AMD Null Selector Clears Base */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS		(20*32+ 8) /* "" AMD Automatic IBRS */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR	(20*32+ 9) /* "" AMD SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index a85019756003..cb3d0f6e6ac2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define _EFER_SVME		12 /* Enable virtualization */
 #define _EFER_LMSLE		13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */
 #define _EFER_FFXSR		14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */
+#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS		21 /* Enable Automatic IBRS */
 
 #define EFER_SCE		(1<<_EFER_SCE)
 #define EFER_LME		(1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
 #define EFER_SVME		(1<<_EFER_SVME)
 #define EFER_LMSLE		(1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
 #define EFER_FFXSR		(1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
+#define EFER_AUTOIBRS		(1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)
 
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4a0add86c182..cf81848b72f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1238,9 +1238,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]			= "Mitigation: IBRS",
 };
 
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
 		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
@@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
 	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+			msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+		} else {
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+			update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		}
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1580,8 +1584,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
 	 * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
-	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
-	 * enabled.
+	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
+	 * otherwise enabled.
 	 *
 	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index d762654d16a0..b441758d2680 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1229,8 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
-	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
 	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
@@ -1341,8 +1341,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
-	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+	/*
+	 * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature
+	 * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist.
+	 */
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+		if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+		    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+	}
 
 	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
@@ -1404,11 +1412,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
-	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
-	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
-
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
-- 
2.34.1